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INTRODUCTION: THE STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
HO4 is it possible that we can know necessary and universal
truths of contingent and particular things? Again, how is it possible
for knowledge of something, which is unified because of its universal-
ity, to he knowledge of the actually existing things alleged to be
known, which are diversified because of their particularity? In other
words, how is it possible for our knowledge expressed by the term "man"
to be knowledge of that which both John and Paul are?
This seemingly simple problem has been at the root of much philo-
sophical inquiry, This problem is involved in the pre-Socratic vacil-
lation between being and becoming. When Heraclitus expounded his doc-
trines of diversity and constant fluctuation he was recognizing the
actual condition of the world. When Parmenides expounded his doctrine
of the unity and constancy of being he did so on the basis of the nec-
essary and universal principle of identity. This problem led Plato to
the doctrine of the Forms, or Ideas, in which that which was known was
not the particular and contingent things of the world, but were the
ideal types or forms of various things in which the particular things
participated. This problem also led Kant to distinguish between the
phenomenal world, or the world as it appear to 1_4, and the ncumenal
world of the things-in-themselves, in terms of this distinction he con-
tended that it is only the phenomenal world which can be known. Em-
1
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piricism speaks to this problem in an opposite manner by maintaining
that knowledge is knowledge of particular and contingent things, but
it does so at the expense of limiting concepts to images or mental
pictures whicn include in their representations the particularities
and contingencies of things.1 The Thomistic position expounded by
Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) maintains that necessary and universal
knowledge is in fact knowledge of contingent and particular things.
The fundamental difference between Maritain's solution to this problem
of knowledge and, for example, those of Plato, Kant and other idealist
positions, concerns the involvement of contingent and particular things
in the acquisition of knowledge. In other words, one fundamental as-
pect of Maritain's solution, without which it would not be the realist
position that it is, is the involvement of being in all kinds of know-
ledge.
The primary interest in this work is to examine Maritain's so-
lution to this problem in philosophy, and to examine it as it applies
to the various kinds of knowledge. Thus, this position will be exam-
ined in connection with knowledgc in general, or in connection with what
might be called common sense knowledge. We will also examine the kinds
1Aquinas has made this point concerning the limitation of know-
ledge to images of sensible things in connection with some pre-Platonicphilosophers. "For Democritus held that al) .knowledne is caused by 
images issuing from the bodies we think of  and enterihg into our souls,as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus. And Aristotle says that
Democritus held that knowledge is caused by a discharge  of images.
And the reason for this opinion was that both Democritus and other
early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as
Aristotle relate. Consequently, since the sense is imuted by the
sensible, they thought that all our knowledge is caused merely by an





, areas of inquiry which may seem threatened by modern science. Psy-
chology, with its historical and contemporary emancipation from phi-
losophy, is a good example of an area for which this reflection has
4,1
implications. Again, ethies is often thought cf. as capable of pro-
ducing merely opinion as compared with the precise and predictable
of knowledge which are proper to the various sciences,2 both specu-
lative and practical. Furthermore, throughout the consideration in
this work of Maritain's solution, as it applies to the various kinds
of knowledge to be considered, the fundamental involvement of being
will be followedL
It must be recognized that this problem in epistemology does
not command a large group of interested readers and in this sense it
is somewhat esoteric--if this term can be used without elitist over-
tones. There is another interest in this work, however, which is not
as limited in its relevance. This interest is in reflecting upon the
kind of knowledge which is acquired by modern science as compared to
other kinds of knowledge. Although this reflection is relevant par-
ticularly to the philosophy of science--and to those scientists who
wish to make philosophical claims--there are implications for other
4
knowledge of modern science. There are also implications here for re-
ligious knowledge and theological knowledge in particular. Let us ex-
plain this second interest in greater detail.
What degree of ireertance i Lo be bestowed properly on the
2The term "science here does not have the same connotation
as that of modern science. The reference of "science" as contrasted
to modern science will be explained below.
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knowledge offered by the modern experimental sciences? What is the
value of an explanation by modern science of the world in which we live?
Does modern science have eclusive claim to the explanation of man and
his world? Is an explanation of modern science to be esteemed above
all other explanations? :n other words, just what is the proper place
of the knowledge offered by modern science? Again, what kind of know-
ledge is the knowledge ef modern science?
The contemporary placement of modern science is in a rather
prominent position. It is often assumed or contended that the know-
ledge of modern science is the only knowledge which is certain and ex-
planatory of what there is. It is often assumed that if something is
to be known with certainty, it has to be proved by modern science. It
is more often assumed that that which is known by modern science is
not to be disputed (except perhaps by scientists themselves). Modern
science has acquired a great amount of authority with regard to the
determination of that which is known and that which can be known. Not
infrequently, one hears the phrase, in retort, "science has proven that
" with the implicatie, being that knowledge which is not acquired
by the method proper to modern science is incorrect if it is contrary
to the knowledge of modern science. Or, if the knewledge in question
is not contrary to modern science, the implication is that it is not
as certain as the knowledge which is acquired by modern science. Sim-
ilarly, the attitude is not uncowon that if one wisht- -, to "get the
facts" com:erning S070 sitJation, or if. one wishes to be as precise as
possible, one's knowledge should be 'scientifically rroven." The im-
plication often being that a greater degree of precion--attained by
dealing with smaller and smaller parts of the situation and by being
S
more exact in one's sensible observations--results in a greater de-
gree of certainty or reliability or truthfulness. Or, the attitude
is not uncommon that man's knowing capabilities are the same, in kind,
as the capabilities of computers. This is implied, for example, by
the sense of relief that is often felt upon experiencing that a com-
puter cannot produce something which can be produced by one's own
mental activity. Besides the claims of superiority, there are claims
of exclusiveness with regard to the method of modern science. It has
been claimed, and it is a common attitude, that knowledge consists
only of that which is acquired by relying on data which is accessible
to modern science. In accord with the manner or method of modern sci-
ence, it is not uncommon to deny, or at least to doubt, that whatever
is not directly sensible (an object of sensation or of the senses)
should be believed. Those that do believe in, or claim to have know-
ledge of, that which is not directly sensible, are often regarded as
those who, for purposes of romanticism or whatever, irrationally re-
fuse to be scientific and accept the world as viewed by modern sci-
ence. Or, with a more gem_ •ol connotation, they may often merely be
labelled as "mystics. A more sophisticated form of essentially the
same denial or doubt as stated above is that unless something is sub-
ject to the imagination, it is not understandable or we do not have
knowledge of it. That is, in order to have knowledge of something,
it must be possible to construct imaginatively a model of that which
is known. This position is usually not explicitly stated; however,
it is implicit in the mechanism and materialism which is common in
modern science. These are only a few, briefly stated, exemplifications
of the authority which modern science possesses with regard to knowledge
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itself, or with regard to that which is known or can be known. fur-
ther reflection would surely result in other instances. These, how-
ever, are sufficient here in order to draw attention to the prevalent
influence of modern science.
Along with this prevalent influence of modern science the
meaning of the term "science" has changed since the onset of the tre-
mendous advances of modern science. The term "science" today refers
almost exclusively to the experimental sciences which consist of biol-
ogy, chemistry, and physics, along with their various divisions and
overiappings. "The concept that Aristotle and the ancients had of it
[science] is very different from the one that moderns have constructed
because, for the latter, it is the eminent digrity of the experimental
sciences, the positive sciences, the sciences of nature, the sciences
of phenomena as we say, which appropriates the notion of science."3
The knowledge of these sciences is bound to that which is sensibly
observable. Scientific knowledge according to the ancient and medi-
eval understanding of such, however, had requirements other than that
of being knowledge of that which is sensible. In the following pas-
sage, Maritain gives two requirements for knowledge to be scientific
knowledge, namely, that it be explanatory or that it offer the reasons
for the existence of that which is known, and that it be necessarily
truthful in its representation of that which is known.
We would contend that science is d knowledge perfect in its mode,
or more precisely a knowledge in which, under the compulsion of
evidence, the mind points out in things their reasons for being.
For the mind is not satisfied when it merely attains a thing, i.e.,
any datum whatever, but only when it grasps that upon which that
3Jacques !laritain, The Dpgrees of Knowledge, (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1959), p. 22.
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datum is founded in being and intelligibility. Cognitio certa
per causas, as the ancients would say: knowledge by demonstration
(in other words mediately evident) and explanatory knowledge.
We see at once that it is a knowledge so rooted as to be neces-
sarily true, that it cannot not be true, or is in conformity
with what is. For it would not be a knowledge perfect in its
mode, an infrangible knowledge, if it could be found false.4
The contemporary claims for and attitudes concerning modern
science which place it in its prominent position can be explained in
terms of this classical notion of science. It is often maintained ex-
plicitly or implicitly either that the knowledge of the experimental
sciences has exclusive claim to, or is the epitomy of, knowledge which
can be called scientific in this classical sense. That is, the know-
ledge of the experimental sciences is often considered to be the only
kind, or the most proper kind, of knowledge which gives a certain ex-
planation of man and the world in which he lives. For the ancients and
medievals, however, other kinds of knowledge were capable of offering
scientific knowledge or certain explanations of what there is.
The question can now be posed concerning the appropriateness--
indeed, the correctness--of the prominent position given to modern sci-
ence. I) -)es the vast increase in the amount of knowledge which has been
acquired by the experimental sciences warrant clair6 of exclusiveness
or superiority? One purpose of this work is to show, through the work
of Jacques Maritain, that sucn claims are not warranted and that such
knowledge is only one kind of knowledge which has its proper place
among other kinds of certain and explanatory knowledge. In other words,
one intention is tu inquire into the proper epistemological perspec-





If modern science is placed in its proper epistemological
perspective among all kinds of knowledge, or among all "degrees of
knowledge," the implications of this realization can be recognized as
being as pervasive as the influence itself of modern science. That is,
the implications of this realization are relevant to all the attitudes,
beliefs, habits, and values which have felt the influence of, or have
been formed by, modern science. For example, it will be possible to
recognize the problems, misconceptions, and unjustified assumptions
which are involved in the instances given above of the influence c.nd
authority of modern science with regard to knowledge claims.
In order to fulfill this purpose, knowledge other than the
knowledge of modern science will have to be examined, and will have
to be defended as being scientific knowledge in a classical sense.
Speculative knowledge—knowledge acquired for its own sake or in the
name of truth—will be defended as scientific in the th'rd chapter by
the placement of knowledge offered by modern science among the other
kinds of speculative knowledge. Practical knowledge—knowledge ac-
quired for the sake of directing human actions or in the name of the
good of man—will be defended as scientific in the fourth chapter by
means of an example of practical knowledge, namely, moral knowledge or
knowledge offered by ethical inquiries,
CHAPTER II
KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL
In order to distinguish the subject matter of the present chap-
ter from that of the following chapter, a distinction must be made be-
tween knowledde in general and scientific knowledge. The concern of
this chapter is with knowledge in general, and the concern of the fol-
lowing chapter is that of scientific knowledge. We need to explain this
distinction between knowledge in general and scientific knowledge be-
fore we proceed with the proper subject matter of this chapter.
If someone were to ask me if I knew of a person who would be
willing and able to perform some task, I would know what it is that is
desired. That is, I would know whether or not such a person existed
among my acquaintances. If, however, someone were to ask me if I
could provide information concerning just what a person is, a different
kind of knowledge would be called into question. If able, I could pro-
vide biological information concerning man's position in the hierarchy
of all other living things. Or, if able, I could provide theological
information concerning man's relation to God. These two examples mere-
ly point to the distinction between knowledge in general and scientific
knowledge, and we can elucidate the distinction which is only implicit
in these examples.
Scientific knowledge, as previously defined,1 consists of know-
1See above, p. 6-7.
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ledge which is necessarily truthful in its representation of that which
is known, and which is explanatory of that which is known. Knowledge
in general can be defined as knowledge which fulfills only the former
requirement of scientific knowledge, i.e., the requirement which deals
with the certitude of knowledge of things other than the knower. It
is not desirable to consider knowledge in general as non-scientific in
this regard, for that would lead the way to a Kantian, or Platonic,
position, for example, in which it is maintained that there is no cer-
tain knowledge of particular and contingent things other than the knower.
As will become clear in the present chapter, it is fundamental to
Maritain's Thomistic realist position that we actually do have cer-
tain knowledge of contingent and particular things.
Knowledge in general can be further defined in a preliminary
way by saying that it does not fulfill the otner requirement for sci-
entific knowledge. Knowledge in general is not to be considered as
knowledge which is explanatory of what there is, but rather, it is
merely knowledge that something is. What is known by knowledge in
general is the actual existence (being) of something other tharM:he
knower, or the being which is exhibited by actually existing sensible
things. We might say that knowledge of this kind merely answers the
question of whether or not something exists. Scientific knowledge, on
the other hand, not only answers the question of whether or not some-
thing exists, but also answers questions concerning what that something
is.2
2Something like the following objection might be raised here.
We would generally consider the knowledge expressed by the phrase "this
page is white" to be coon sense, "everyday" knowledge. This knowledge
however gives partial explanation concerning what "this page" is, and
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A further distinction can be made between knowledge in general
and scientific knowledge in terms of the processes of abstraction by
which they are acquired. The activity of knowing, considered in gener-
al, involves a process of abstraction which has traditionally been
called "abstractio total is,' or abstraction as it is applicable to
all acquisitions of knowledge. Maritain refers to abstraction by the
term "intellectual visualization," and correspondingly refers to total
abstraction by the term "extensive visualization." He explains exten-
sive visualization as follows.
At first intellectual visualization is as yet only extensive.
That is to say, its object is not explicitly the type or essence
abstracted by and for itself, in Platonic terminology the super-
temporal form in which objects partake. No doubt the essence
is there, but contained in the notion after a fashion wholly implic-
it or blind, as it were hinted, not such that thought can em-
ploy or handle it. What the intellect expresses to itself and
explicitly visualizes is simply an object of thought, . . . Con-
tact has been made with the intelligible order, the order of
the universal in general; but nothing more. The first step has
been taken by which we leave the world of sensible experience
thus it is not merely knowledge "that something is. So according to
the distinctions made here, the knowledge expressed by the phrase "this
page is white" would be scientific knowledge. In order to retain these
rather general distinctions, which are made for the sake of convenience
and orderliness of discussion, let me respond by saying that this ob-
jection simply points out some overlap of what can be placed in each
"catagory," i.e., what would be called scientific knowledge, accor-
ding to these distinctions, may be so elementary or primitive 3S sci-
entific knowledge that it may also be considered a matter of common
sense. Consider these more obvious examples: "frogs are animals" is
a very primitive biological classification and it is also generally
considered to be a matter of common sense; "a triangle has three sides"
is a very primitive bit of mathematical knowledge, and it is also gen-
erally considered to be a matter of common sense. Thus, in this line,
we might say that "this page is white" is a very primitive aesthetic
explanation of this page. :n order to retain these distinctions then,
let us accept the knowledge expressed by examples such as these as
scientific knowledge, however primitive, and let us accept that know-
ledge in general is here restricted to our concepts of "page," "white-
ness," "frogs," "animal," "triangle," "three," "side," etc.
and enter the intellectual world.3
Let us take an example such as our knowledge expressed by the
term "person" in order to obtain greater clarity. Our knowledge ex-
pressed by the term "person" which is acquired through abstractio tc-
talis is merely knowledge which enables us to distinguish a person from
an ape for example. It is knowledge of personhood to the extent that
it enables us to point to our neighbor and say "this is a person."
The essence of the person pointed to in this instance, that which com-
poses personhood, is not explicitly known, but rather remains implicit
in the knowledge which enables us to "point to" a person. Knowledge
in general, acquired by abstractio totalis is knowledge of examples,
or is knowledge adequate to the giving of examples of what is known.
Here the knowledge of the essence of a person, knowledge of what a
person is, remains implicit in the knowledge which enables one te give
an example of a person.
There is a second kind of abstraction by which scientific
knowledge is acquired. This kind of abstraction has traditionally been
called "abstractio formal is.' By means of this kind of abstraction,_
knowledge passes beyond the rather simple knowledge in which the es-
sence of that which is known remains implicit, to a knowledge of the
essence of the thing known. Maritain prefers to refer to abstractio
formalis as "intensive visualization." By means of this kind of ab-
straction "we make contact with the order of the universal  type and es-
sential intelligibility and the typical form is explicitly abstracted
and laid bare." In this kind of abstraction "the mind separates from
3Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics, (New York: The
New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1962), p. 77.
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the contingent and material data the essence of an object of knowledge,
that which formally constitutes it. lhis intensive or typifying visu-
alization is the beginning of scientific knowledge, knowledge in the
strict sense," i.e., knowledge of the necessary intelligibilities of
things.4
Maritain's account of knowledge which will be explicated in
the present chapter is an account of knowledge in general. The solu-
tion to the problem of knowledge which this account offers centers pri-
marily on the formation of concepts of that which sensibly exists a-
part from the knower. That which sensibly exists apart from the knower
will be seen to be the basis for the formation of concepts, and will be
seen to be the critecia for the verification of concepts. In other words,
that which sensibly exists apart from the knower will be seen to be the
starting point of concepts and the point of verification of concepts.
Throughout the development and verification of concepts, then, the in-
volvement of that which is, the involvement of being, will become ap-
parent.
Where to Begin—Idealism Versus Realism
As indicated previously5 Maritain's Thomistic account of know-
ledge, or solution to the fundamental problem of knowledge, disagrees
with idealist6 accounts In'that it maintains that knowledge is depen-
4
Ibid.
5SPe ibove, p. 2.
6T
he term "idealist" here has no reference to romanticism or to
those who are prone to eternal optimism. Rather, it is used as a generic
term which refers to those philosophers who begin opistemological inquiry
with ideas rather than with the sensible things of the world existing a-
part from the knower.
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dent upon particular and contingent being which is other than the knower;
and furthermore, it is contrary to idealist accounts in that it main-
tains that knowledge, necessary and universal knowledge, actually is
knowledge of particular  and contingent being other than the knower. In
view of this fundamental difference between idealist's and Thomistic
realist's accounts of knowledge, let us begin our examination of Maritain's
solution by considering the initial dependence of knowledge on parti-
cular and contingent being which is other than the knower, as this ini-
tial dependence is in contrast to the starting point of idealist's ac-
counts.
In Maritain's view, an account of knowledge, or a "critique of
knowledge" as he prefers tc call it, is an activity of reflecting upon
knowledge which has already been acquired. It is nut an activity which
begins by accepting as known only that which is a product of reflec-
tion upon knowledge.
It is absurd to demand that philosophical thought begin, even be-
fore it knows anything validly, by proving that it can know (for
it could only do so if it did know). It is absurd to suppose at
the very start that anything which cannot help but be judged true
by the mind can, as a result of some evil genius, not be true, so
that then that .elf-same mind might be asked to show that, as a
matter of fact, it is not so. It is absurd to admit that the mind
could only attain phenomenal objects and then ask it to prove that
such objects are extramental realities.7
The absurdities of which Maritain is here speaking can be grouped
under the heading of idealism. Much of Maritain's criticism of ideal-
ism is directed towards Descartes, whom he considers not only to be the
father of modern philosophy because of the influential changes (indeed,
the fundamental ,.eversal'; in the ancient and medieval structure of philo-
•
7Maritaln, The De9rees  of Knowledge, p. 74.
15
sophical knowledge) which he brought about, hut also to be the father
of the greatest errors of idealism in modern accounts of knowledge.
The most fundamental error of Descartes and subsequent ide-
alists is the point at which they begin an account of knowledge. Such
a starting point might be stated in general as an act of knowledge a-
bout knowledge. In Descartes the starting point is the cogito. This
starting point is absurd, according to Maritain, because it is not in
accord with our first apprehensions, namely, that something exists.
It is not in accord with what has been called a primary "judicative in-
tuition of being," or an immediate and direct apprehension that things
other than ourselves are.3 Any kind of Cartesian cogito is absurd as
a starting point of an account of knowledge because one "cannot think
about a 'thought thing' until after one has thought about a 'thinkable
thing."9 In starting with a Cartesian cogito one is starting at the
wrong end so to speak. That is, rather than starting realistically
with the acceptance of the things about which we have primary and di-
rect knowledge and then giving an account of the process involved in
acquiring such knowledge, Descartes starts with an act of knowing a-
bout knowledge and then attempts to connect that ect with things other
than the knower. conito, ergo res sunt is the very antithesis of scho-
lastic realism which starts with the res.M Maritain points outil that
80liver Lacombe, 'Jacques Maritain Metaphysician," The New
Scholasticism 46 (Winter 1972): 20.
N. Y.:
9Maritain, The L,eyrees of Knowledge, p. 108, (italics mine).
Mibid., p. /l.
"Jacques Maritain, The Dream of Descartes, (Port Washington,
Kennikat Press, 1969), pp. 35-6.
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one of the two important truths1 -? which Descartes pointed out is the
old truth stated by the command, "Go back into thyself and into the
spiritual element which is within thee." The problem here is that this
truth, and consequently the first revelation which adhering to this
truth brought to Descartes, namely his cogito, is not to be the starting
point of an account of knowledge but is to be recognized as a part of
the process of acquiring knowledge. In the process of retreating into
himself in his method of doubt, Descartes failed to adopt the natural
starting point of the senses and of what is sensed.13
Contrary to the place of any kind of Cartesian c_plito in an
idealist account of knowledge, Marl tam maintains that such knowledge
is secondary and not primary; and even as secondary it is not cut off
from being in the form of extramental things. Our primary knowledge
is knowledge of the existence of things other than ourselves, i.e.,
knowledge of extramental existents. This knowledge might be termed com-
mon sense knowledge, or knowledge acquired prior to reflection upon that
knowledge. This knowledge is primarily oriented to sensible objects
which are independent of the knower, i.e., the origins of human know-
ledge are in sensory perceptions.14 A critique of this knowledge, or
an account of the process of acquiring this knowledge is second-order
knowledge, or knowledge of knowledge. A critique of knowledge consists
of reflective knowledge, or a knowledge which is acquired by reflecting
12The other truth, namely, the possibility of a physico-
mathematical science, will be dealt with in the next chapter.
1 . •3Mari tain, The Dream  of Descartes, p. 39.
14John J. FitzGerald, "Maritain's Critical ealism," in
Jacques Nritaim The  Man and His Achievement, ed. Joseph W. Evans,
(WW York: SHeed & Ward, Inc., 1963), p. 59.
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or by turning back upon the mind's previous work of knowing things
other than itself. Thus, a proper critique of knowledge does not be-
gin by doubting the existence of extramental things and then attempt
to deduce an account of knowledgo of extramental things from a sup-
posedly primary act of knowing about knowledge. Rather, a proper cri-
tique of knowledge begins by accepting as immediately evident, not that
I think, hut that I know that something exists, (scio aliqi4jd esse),
and then gives an account of the process which makes this knowledge pos-
sible.15 In the process of reflecting on the primary activity of know-
ing, the actual starting point of all knowledge is determined to be know-
ledge of the existence of things other than the knower. This experi-
ence of knowing, established upon reflection as prior to that reflec-
tion and as the starting point for that reflection, i.e., for the cri-
tique of knowledge, can be expressed as follows: "I am aware of know-
ing--I  am aware of knowing at least one thing,  that what is, is; not I
think."
16
rrrefutable evidence of this experience (knowledge.) of ex-
tramental things being the actual starting point of a critique of know-
ledge is supplied, according to Maritain, by the principle of identity.
151t is - I appropiate here to note what Maritain says about the
so-called naivete of accepting such immediate evidence. "Let us note
parenthetically, naivete and the superstitious fear of being naive are
the two foes of a sound critique. Insofar as philosophy is a wisdom,
it has to verify its organs and instruments in proportion to its ad-
vances. It should accept nothing from nature or culture without ex-
amining ane judging it for itself. But to claim 'to justify itself from
its very roots' and to accept nothing whatever from nature, to make the
passage to the world consist in its being verified, these contentions
shut philo!;ophy up in a pure artificiality that is much the worst kind
of nai'iete, for it is the naivete of the proiessor. That is what those
philosophers do who apply themselves in this fashion to the task of
'putting an end to all naivete' so that one often wonders how they
could have been born." The Decrees of Knowledge, pp. 82-3.
1 6r.,. aritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 76.
4 18
When one accepts as immediately evident that what is, is, one is ac-
knowledging already a reference to things other than the knower. Thus,
even in the immediately evident principle of identity there is not a
limitation of what is known to a simple cogito_. The principle of iden-
tity thus provides a nccessary connection between the mind and things.
17
In Maritain's starting point of knowledge, namely, I know that
something exists--scio aliyid esse--two meanings cEin be distinguished
which involve the distinction between primary, direct knowledge and its
starting point, and secondary, reflexive knowledge (knowledge of the
critique) and its starting point. In the statement, "I know that some-
thing exists," one can intend to convey that something  exists, or one
can intend to convey that one knows such. When referring, as in the
former case, to the fact that something exists, one is referring to the
starting point of one's first and direct knowledge of extramental
things, i.e., one is referring to the starting point of all knowledge,
or to the "starting point of philosophy as a whole." When referring,
as in the latter case, to the fact that one knows such, one is refer-
ring to the starting point of one's secondary, reflexive knowledge of
knowledge of extramental things, i.e., the starting point of a cri-
tique cf knowledge.18 In other words, one is referring to the secondary
reflexive activity of making explicit (coming to know explicitly) what
was only implicit in the direct knowledge that something exists. It
should remain clear that Maritain's starting point of the critique is
in no way a Cartesian cogito, cut off from extramentai things, for in




critique, as reflective knowledge of knowing, it yet remains the case
that the critique consists of acquiring knowledge of what is involved
in knowing that something exists. In either case the starting point
is not the knower but is that which is other than the knower. As
Maritain states:
The position we are defending should be clear. Inasmuch
as the intellect primarily bears neither on itself, nor on the
ego, but on being, then the very first evidence (I mean first
in the order of nature, I am not talking about the chronologi-
cal order, in which, what is first in itself is often only im-
plicit), the evidence that is first in itself for the intellect,
is that of the principle of identity 'discovered' in the intel-
lectual aprrehension of being or the real. 19
Other differences between a Thomistic account of knovledge and
an idealist account can be seen to follow from the fundamental differ-
ence in starting points. Maritain presents the following two.2°
First, since that which is known is the existence of extramental things,
an attempt at universal doubt concerning such things (or a "'brack-
eting' of ail certitude about the being of things") is not in order.
Obviously, when one accepts the primacy of knowledge of the existence
of extramental things, i.e., the knowledge of such before a reflec-
tive critique of that knowledge, one rules out the legitimacy of adop-
ting the method of initially doubting the existence of such things in
order to account for knowledge of such things.
Secondly, Descartes and others (notably Husserl) consider a
critique of knowledge to be a prerequisite to any future philosophical
inquiry. That is, in order to engage in other inquiries we must first
be certain )ut the possibilities of knowledge. Here again the star-
p. 77.
20Ib1d., pP • 78-80.
20
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tiny point is assumed not to be a prior knowledge of the existence of
extramental things. When one accepts on the other hand, in accord
with Thomistic realism, that the "being of sensible things" is what
is first known, one also realizes that a critique of knowledge "pre-
supposes a long effort of knowing" prior to such reflective activity.21
Thus a Thomistic critique of knowledge is different from every
idealistic critique with regard to the point at which such critiques
start (simply stated as being or existence, as opposed to knowledge),
and involved in this difference are differences with regard to the me-
thod employed and the connections a critique of knowledge has with other
intellectual inquiries.
An Account of the Formation of the Concept 
Thing as Thing and Thing as Object
In order to begin an account of how the acquisition of know-
ledge of extramental things is possible, Maritain begins with an ex-
amination of the relation and differences between the extramental thing
in itself (thing as thing) and the thing as Dart of the intellect
(thing as object).
The thing as thing is to be understood as that which exists
or is able to exist for itself. It is the material object in Thomistic
terms. "What characterizes any thing as thing is its being what it
is and existing as such apart from its originating cause or causes,"
i.e., it exists when the initiating causes are no longer present.22
This existence of the thing up to now has been called "extramental"
21Ibid., p. 79.
22FtzGerald, "Maritain's Critical Realism," p. 61.
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existence of the thing. Maritain also uses the terms "premental, i.e.
preceding the knowledge we have of it," and "metalogical" existence,
in that the thing as thing does not belong to "that which is properly
constituted by the life of reason."23 The thing as object is to be
understood as that which exists as known or considered in the realm
of intelligibility. It is the formal object in Thomistic terms. It
is that which belongs to the order of the krewn as known.24
Here again, the work of Descartes is seen to be the initiator
23Aaritain, The Degrees of Knowle.dge, pp. 91-2. Maritain also
points out in this connection that extramental existence is intended
to refer not only to actual extramental existrmce, hut also to potential
existence of the thing as thing. The reason for this involves an under-
standing of the notion of judament which follows from the relation of
the thirg as thing and the thing as object. That is, we can not only
judge concerning what actually exists, but also what can possibly exist.
Maritain states that "our intellect, in simple apprehension, abstracts
from existence in act and in its judgments it does not only judo' of
that which exists but also of a thing that can or cannot exist." He
adds a concise insight here when he says that many modern accounts of
knowledge confuse that which is possibly real, or potentially extramen-
tally existent, with a being of reason--an object of the intellect which
is incapable of extramental existence but which is constructed from that
which can cr does exist extramentally--and consequently consider the
"actual real" or actual extramental existence as the only real.
24
In this connection Maritain offers what he considers to be
more pedantic terms for distinguishing the knowing subject and the
thing in order to avoid being suspect of a "vulgar tongue." In giving
these terms he also hints at doctrines to come such as knowing con-
sisting of being that which is known, and the identity, as far as that
which is known, of the formal object and the material object. He says
that he "will say that just as the object is the correlative of a know-
ing subject, an ontological 'for itself,' to which it shows itself and
which, by reflecting upon its own acts of thought immediately perceives
. . . the fact of its own existence--we may call this the cisobjective
subject--it is also not correlative to, but inseparable (because it is
itself) from, an ontological 'for itself' which precisely takes the name
'object [thing as thing] from the fact that is presented to the mind
and this we may call the objectifiable subject or transobjective sub-
ject--not, certainly, becauseifis hidden-6Fhind the object Theremean-
ing object as known, or thing as object] but, on the contrary, because
it is itself grasped as object and yet constitutes something irreducible
in which the possibility of grasping new obj%cts always remains open."
Maritain, The De9rees of  Knowledge, pp. 93-4.
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of that to which Maritain is so much opposed. In Descartes and sub-
sequent idealists, what is here called the object is cut off or "de-
related"25 from the thing in which it does or can exist. "The trag-
edy of modern noetic began when the scholastics of the decadent peri-
od—with Descartes in their wake--separated the object_ from the thins.;
from that point on, the thing became a problematic 'lining' concealed
behind the object."26 The allusion to Kant's de-related phenomena and
noumena (or, if related, unknowably so) is here evident also. This "de-
relation" occurred in order to account for necessary and universal know-
ledge. If the object is taken as such, i.e., separate from dny extra-
mental thing, then one will either have to reconstruit the thing star-
ting with the object, as Descartes attempted to do (whereas Kant con-
cluded that it really didn't matter whether or not the phenomena was
related to the noumena), or one can attempt to "reabsorb the thing and
its existentiality into transcendental subjectivity," as Husserl at-
tempted to do.27
It is appropriate to add here that the extramental thing is
a singular existent, individualized by matter. It is, for example,
my next door neighbor who exists for himself with all his accidents
which place him in a particular spatio-temporal situation. The thing
as object on the other hand in abstracted from such existence and is
univers.A, as evidenced by the fact that our knowledge of "ran" is in-
251 use the term "de-related" here in view of Aquinas' ac-
count briing prior to Descartec.
26Maritain. The pestTes of Knowle_dye, p. 91.
271bid., p. 93.
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elusive of our knowledge of both Socrates and Plato fcr example.
28
Rather than separating the thing as thing and the thing as ob-
ject, Thcmistic realism maintains that they are distinguishaule only
with regard to their mode of existence. They are not two different 
knowables. This is fundamental in proceeding from the thing as thing
to the concept, i.e., it is fundamental to the retaining of being, other
than the knower, or to the retaining of that which is and is other than
the knower, as that which is known. The thing as object, which exists
as known, is abstracted from the actually existing thing as thing and
as such has a potential extramental existence (it obviously has an ac-
tual intelligibility). The thThg as thing, on the other hand, posses-
ses actual extramental existence and potential intelligibility. Thus
the thing as thing and the thing as object are one thing that is known
even though its existence as known is different than its existense a-
Dart from being known. Although somewhat contrived, it might be stated
that the thing as thing is knowable, i.e., it is the same as the thing
as object because of its potential intelligibility which is actualized
in the thing as object; and that the thing as object is "existable."
i.e., it is the same as the thing as thing, because of its potential
28This point is in contrast with the position of empiricism on
this matter. In attempting to account for knowledge of particular and
contingent things, it was maintained that the mental existence of that
which is known includes the contingencies and particularities of the
natural existence of that which is known. Evidence of this is the po-
sition on abstraction of Eerkeley and Hu:re in which it is maintained
that "general ideas" are actually particular ideas, i.e., images or ideas
of one particular thing, which are called upon to represent all other
similar things. (The 0E4i0US question here concerns how it is knolwi
that the particular idea or image chosen is representative.) This po-
sition rests on the incorrect assumption that concepts are limited to
images, or to representations of that which can be sensed. See Hume's
A Treatise on Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., (Oxford: The





existence which is actualized in the thing as thing.29 Maritain states:
that if we admit that the mind does truly attain an object that
is valid for itself and by which the mind is measured, we should
also, and to the same degree, admit that it attains a thing (be
it actual or possilqle), a transobjective subject, which is one
with that object.Ju
And again:
But what is capital in this regard is that while existing in two
different states (10 in the concept, in a state of abstraction and
universality which allows it to be handled, divided, compared by
the mind, and to enter into the concatenations of discourse; 20
in the thing, in a state of individuality and concreteness),
nevertheless the object and the t,ing do rot constitute two known
terms, two guod's, but only one. One and the same term of know-
ledge, one and the same guod, exists for itself as thing, and is
attained by the mind as object.31
Thus one does not have to exclude either the thing as thing or the thing
as object from that which is known. We do not have to choose either
one or the other as that which is known. What we have then is one thing
which is known. This one thing which is known exists both extramentally
as a singular existent, in itself--the material object--and in the mind
as abstracted and universal--the formal object.32
29
 
This - s contrary to Platonism, idealism, and empiricism, al1
of which incorrectly assume that the manner of existence of the thing
as known must be the same as the manner of its natural existence. Thus,
Plato developed the necessary and universal Forms as that which is known;
Kant, for example, developed the phenomenal world of things as they ap-
pear to us; and Berkeley and Hume, on the other hand, relegated knowledge
to imaginable constructs of things which included the particularities
and contingencies of things.
30Maritain, The Degrees  of Knowledce, p. 94.
31Ibid., p. 121.
32Maritain reproduces an objection (The Degrees of Knowledge,
p. 94), given by Fonsegrive, to this fundamental tenet concerning the
identity of the thing as thing and the thing as object with regard
to that which is known, and he also gives J. de Tonquedec's reply.
This objection and reply seem significant enought to me to reproduce
them again. "'The concept of an object that would at the same time
25
Intentionality and the Species
We have been considering knowledge in its relation to extra-
mental being, and this so far has involved the distinction and rela-
tion between the thing as object and the thing as thing. As indica-
ted above, the thing as thing and the thing as object are distinguished
with regard to their modes of existence. We must now consider the mode
of existence which is proper to the thing as object, or the mode of ex-
istence of that which is known considered as actually intelligible.
This discussion will lead to a more complete understanding cf that which
is actually intelligible, i.e., that which is actually intelligible
will be seen to involve the concept, considered in its intentional
function, as species. Thus, this discussion will lead to a more
complete understanding of the relation between that which is actual-
ly intelligible and that which is potentially intelligible, i.e., the
thing as thing. In other words, we now move to a consideration of the
formation of the concept on the "side" of intelligibility.
For Maritain the concept has two functions; first, its entita-
exist in itself and be the object of knowledge is quite clearly con-
tradictory. . . . For, to speak of the object of knowledge is to speak
of the thing as known. . . . Now, it is only too clear that the known
does not exist in itself, since it exists as thing known' (Essais sur
la connaissance, p. 186). J. de Tonquedec correctly replies: This
raT.fier formal argument proves only one thing: the fact of existing
in itself is different from the fact of being known. But because the
one is not the other, it does not follow that the one excludes the
other. The concepts are different but it is not 'quite cleaFr that
they cannot be realized together and in the same being. By pitting
abstractions one against the other in this way it could just as well
be proved that the 'concept' of a moon that was at once round and
shining 'is clearly contradictory' because the moon is not round in-
sofar as it is shining' (J. de Tonquedec, La critique de la  connais-
sance, p. 32, note)."
26
tive function in which it is considered as a modification of the knower,
and second, its intentional function in which it is considered as a
formal sign of that which is known. Since our aim here is to consider
the concept in its relation to the thing known, we will thus be consid-
ering the intentional function of the concept. (Its entitative func-
tion will be readily understandable in the process.)
It has been pointed out that the thing as object is part of
the realm of intelligibility. That which is potentially intelligible
in the thing as thing comes to be actually intelligible in the knower
as the thing as object. This points to an important tenet of Maritain's
account of knowledge. According to such, knowing involves an acquisi-
tion, on the part of the knower, of that which is other than the knower,
(of course, that which is acquired, is acquired imaterially). Knowing
involves the knower coming to be other than what he is, i.e., the knower
actualizes in his intellect something other than what he is.33 As
Maritain states, "to know is to be in a certain way something other than
what one is: it is to become a thing other than the self,_ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _ •
or become the other as other
to be
33The entitative function of the concept can be understood in
connection with this assimilation of the knower and the known. In
such assimilation the knower (the intellect of the knower) acquires
greater actuality and the concept can be considered as an accident or
modification of the knower.
34Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 112, see also Jacques
Maritain, The Range  of Reason, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952),
p. 12. In this connection one can readily understand the following two
points in a Thomistic account of knowledge. First, thlt knowledge adds
to the existence of the knower, i.e., it increases the actuality of the
intellect. "Knowing is an active, immaterial super-existence whereby
a subject not only exists with an existence limited to what that sub-
ject is as a thing enclosed within one genus--as subject existing for
itself--but with an unlimited existence in which by its own activity
27
It would appear initially that this would compromise drv,ti-
cally the distinction between the knower and the known. How can it be
the case that the known is distinct from the knower and yet be a part
of the knower? The solution to this apparent problem is provided by
the notion of intentional existence. By distinguishing between nat-
ural existence and intentional existence, and then by maintaining that
the known intentionally exists in the knower, one can yet maintain
that the knower and the known in their natural existence are distinct.
Natural existence can be understood as the positing of a "thing out-
side nothingness for itself and as a subject..35 In this natural mode
of existence the knower and the known are other to each other. Or,
there is an "ontological diversity" between the two.36 Intentional
existence however, is to be understood as "an entirely tendential and
immaterial existence" in which something exists "for another thing and
as a relation and does not exist for itself.
The same things, in this view, may and do occupy two uni-
verses, a universe of knowledge and a universe of existence.
They exist both outside of the mind by their esse naturae and
at the sme time within the mind by their esse intentional.
Since human knowledge involves inseparably but distinctly the ob-
ject known and the subject knowing, it may be described, on the
part of the thing known, as the process in and through which the
thing acquires an esse intentionale, and on the part of the sub-
ject knowing, as the process in and through which the subject
confers on the things an esse_intentionale, or simply the process
of immaterializing things.37—
it is and becomes itself and other things." Secondly, that knowing does
not consist of the production or the making of anything, but consists
essentially of being something. The Durees of Knowledge, pp. 113 & 117.
35Ibid., p. 114.




It has been said above that the thing as object has a poten-
tial existence in extramental things. We have now said that that
which is known intentionally exists in the knower. What is the dif-
ference in meaning here? In stating the former, what is being refer-
red to as having potential existence in extramental things is exclu-
sively that which is the object of knowledge or that which is known.
In the latter case it is also that which is known which is now given
intentional existence. But there is another "aspect" of actual intel-
ligibility which intentional existence implies, namely, the intention-
al function of that which is actually intelligible. In other words,
intentional existence implies reference to the fact that that which is
actually intelligible is not only that which is known (as known), but
also is the means by which something is known; and thus, that which is
actually intelligible is the means by which the known becomes inten-
tionally part of the knower. That which is actually intelligible when
considered as such, i.e., as the means by which the knower assimilates
himself to the known, (resulting in the intentionally existing known)
is termed, in Thomistic language, the "species," or what Maritain calls
the "presentative form."38 The species, or presentative forms, in that
they are the means by which something is known, are formal signs of
something known and not instrumental signs of something known. That
is, they are signs whose whole essence is to make known something else
and are not known themselves; and they are not signs which are them-
selves first known, and being known, then make known something else.39
38Varitain, The Degrees of Knowledit, p. 115.
39Ibid., p. 119.
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"Thus, presentative forms, concepts in particular, are pure means of
knowing; scholastics called them objectum quo, mental objects by which
L.e knowledge takes place. What is known through these immaterial species,
they called objectum quod, the object which is known."4°
We are now presented with an apparent problem, namely, that
which is actually intelligible is both that which is known--the thing
as object, the formal object--and, is that by which somethihrj is known--
the species or presentative form, the formal sign. It will be remem-
bered that the thing as object--that which is known, the quod--was de-
scribed as actually intelligible and potentially existent in extramen-
tal things. On the other hand when it is said that that which is known
exists intentionally in the knower, we are referring, because of the
nature of intentionality, to more than the quod which exists inten-
tionally. We are referring also to the fact that that which is actually
intelligible is that by which something is known. In other words, the
presentative forms, or that by which something is known, is now also
seen to be that which is actually intelligible. How can that which is
actually intelligible be both that by which something is known, and
that which is known? In still other words, it would seem that, on
the one hand, the species and the object as known are identical in
that they are that which is actually intelligible; and on the other
hand, it would seem that they are distinct in that the former is a
sign of the latter.
This problem has been raised and presented to Maritain by




If, precisely in respect to the intelligible elements de-
livered to the mind in the act of understanding,3 there is an
identity between the essence, attained as object, and the concept
in its intentional function, how, asks Father Roland-Gosselin,
can the concept be a formal sign? To him 'it appears impossible
to aim to fuse into one' these two principles of solution. In
short, he thinks that 'a choice must be made between relation
of identity and relation of sign.4 I
3It is quite clear, as Father Blanche has so well noted
(Bulletin Thomiste, Nov. 1925, p. [5]), that it is only from this
point of view that we say the presentative form and known ob-
ject constitute but one nature.
In other words, the following is being asked. If the presentative form,
or the concept in its intentional function" and that which is known,
or "the essence, attained as object," are identical in that they are
that which is actually intelligible, or in that they are "the intelli-
gible elements delivered to the mind," then now is it possible for the
presentative form to be a formal sign of that which is known?
Maritain finds the solution to this apparent problem given by
John of St. Thomas. This resolution essentially involves a clarifi-
cation of the nature uf a formal sign. As a formal sign, the species
is not itself known, but purely that by which something is known.
The species may of course become the object of knowledge reflexively,
and thanks to the production of a new concept,.42 but as a formal sign
they are not themselves known. "The concept must be a formal sign, i.e.,
precisely as species it must be nothihg_but sign; it is a pure 'maker'
known,' 43 In order to be a formal sign, and thus in order to con-
tain nothing in itself which can he known apart from that of which it





is a sign, the species must be an exact replica of that which is known,
considered as the formal object. "We claim that it [the concept as
species] is the very likeness of the object, the very similitude and
the pure similitude of the thing understood. . . . Thus, we claim that
the concept is 'identical' with the object, in reference to the intel-
ligible constituent or qpidditative traits..44 (It will be remembered
that the formal object is not an exact replica of the material object,
even though, as pointed out in the previous section, they are one thing
which is known. This is so because the formal object is an immaterial,
and actual intelligible, abstracted from that which is potentially
intelligible in the thing as thing. Thus, the absurd result of an ex-
act replica of the thing as thing existing materially in the mind is
avoided.) The species "therefore must consist in being a pure repre-
senter or vicar of the object, possessing no trait of nature, no quid-
ditative note, that i not a note and trait of the object. There is
the relation of 'identity demanded by the relation of sign itseW."45
We might say that as a formal sign, the species is the sign of that
which is known, and tiAt which is known is here intended to include
the formal object and the material object. On the other hand, as part
of an identity, the species is identical with the formal object only,
since the identity is "in  reference  to the intelligible constituent or 
gLiidditative  traits," or that which is actually intelligible. Tbus,
the species is a sign of that which is known and as such it "differs






in the mind, where it is known, but also extra mentem in esse naturae
as identical with the thing (from which it is not really distinct),
while the concept in its very function of species, exists in esse in-
tentionali."46 The species is also, considered as that which is actual-
ly intelligible, identical with that which is known because it is a
formal sign of that which is known, and can thus consist of nothing
more than what is contained in that which is known as it is actually 
intelligible.
Thus we can see that that which is actually intelligible is
to be considered as more than just the formal object having potential
existence in extramental things. That which is actually intelligible
is also to be considered as intentionally existing in the knower and
as such it fulfills the intentional function of the concept, i.e., it
is considered as the presentative form, or species, which is the means
by which something is known.
We have thus far progressed in this account of the formation of
the concept from the extramentally existing thing as thing to the species
which performs the intentional function of the concept. That which was
4
47
potentially intelligible has acquired actual intelligibility (and con-
sequently the intellect has acquired greater actuality on account of th




47It can be added that the concept acquires actual intelligi-
bility not only as the species or formal sign—this may be considered
its first actuality—but it also acquires actuality--its final act--as
the expression or mental word of the formal sign. "To this initial in-
terior determination or actuation, [the presentative form] it [the in-
tellect] responds by producing within itself a concept, the expressed
intelligible species, in and through which it raises the object to the
peak of intelligible formation and actuality, and thus cor-es itself to
3"
Now that we have acquired an understanding of the concept in
terms of its intentional function (and in the process, in terms of its
entitative function), we can proceed back in the 'direction" of the
extramental real by considering the verification of the concept.
The Returning Verification in Things 
A verified concept is intended here to refer to a concept which
is judged to be true. What does it mean for a concept to be judged as
true? The Thomistic notion of truth, which Maritain adopts, consists
of a conformity between the mind and the thing. Truth is the "'con-
formity of the mind with being, according as it says that what is, is,
and that what is not, is not. A true judgment is made when it is
judged that the concept--which, as we have seen, refers to the thing of
which it is a formal sign--nct only refers to the thing, but accurately
refers to the thing, or when it is adequate in its reference to the
thing. Thus, the criteria for truthful judgments concerning concepts
is being or that which is. In ourjudgments of what is or is not, which
are based on our concepts, we are thus returning to being which is other
than ourselves. We are returning to that which our concepts refer in
order to verify the adequacy of our concepts. The function of judg-
ment then is to make the mind "move" from its concepts to the thing as
actually existing which is represented by the concept. In making a
judgment, the knowing subject "restores to the thing as encountered in
his actual experience what, in conception, he has separated or ab-
be in final act the object." FitzGerald, "Maritain's Critical Re-
alism," p. 70.
-Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 88.
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stracted fron it," namely, its actual existence.49 Thus, for example,
I can make the simple judgment expressed by saying "this page is," or
I can make the more complex judgment involving two concepts and ex-
pressed by saying "this page is white."5° In either case, I am re-
ferring to that which is other than my concept, and I am affirming on
the basis of that which is other than my concept--this page, or this
white page--that my concept is in conformity with what is.
Maritain's notion of judgment, in which the data originally
started with now serves as the criteria for the verification of the
concepts, is in prominent contrast with idealist's notions of judgment.
Let us conclude this section by briefly considering the important dif-
ferences between Maritain's notion of judgment and those of Descartes
and Kant.
The process of judgment occurring sequentially is called rea-
soning, and it can be understood that reasoning in a Thomistic account
of knowledge is a laborious task of attaining true knowledge. A view
which is drastically opposite is again that of Descartes. Maritain
sees in Descartes the rejection of the scholastic process of reason
and the replacement of such by a means of discovery in which all know-
ledge is the result of direct intuition producing clear and distinct
ideas which do not have to be judged with regard to their conformity
with things other than the knower..
Descartes saw then, . . . a means of discovery incomparably
more powerful than reason heavily armed and the logic of the phi-
49FitzGerald, "Maritain's Critical :iealism," p.63
50.,i;nd what is judgment if not an act by which the mind asserts
that a predicate and a subject, which differ in notion or in their intra-
mental existence, are identical in the  thing, or basi-de the mind?"
Maritain, The Dearees of Knowledge. p. 97.
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losophers. We know, moreover, that Cartesian reason with its im-
mediate knowledge of 'simple natures,' its innate ideas, its atoms
of evidence, its claim to replace syllogism with a succession of
discontinuous intuitions, and its quasi-Platonic attempt to re-
duce demonstration to the transcendental unity of a non-discur-
sive intellection--briefly, with its angelic ambitions, had to
remain something entirely different from the classical reason re-
cognized in the human being by Aristotle and the Schoolmen.51
In the following passage also, Maritain accuses Descartes of attribu-
ting an angelic intellect to man in that Descartes desired to reduce
all thought to intuitions--direct and simple perceptions--with  the re-
sult that the process of reasoning which involves the intellect and the
things other than the knower, is excluded.
What does this mean, but that the sole authentic and legiti-
mate archetype of Knowledge is, for him, angelic Knowledge? The
angel neither reasons, nor proceeds by reasoning: he has but one 
intellectual  act, which  is at_pnce perceiving and judgiu: he
sees consequences not successively from the principle, but immedi-
ately in the principle; he is not subject to the progressive actu-
alization of knowledge which constitutes logical movement proper-
ly so called; if his thought travels, it is by intuitive leaps,
from perfect act to perfect act, from intelligible fullness to
intelligible fullness, according to the discontinuity of wholly
spiritual time, which ;s not a succession of instants without
duration, but the permanence of a stable instant which lasts mo-
tionless so long as it does not give place to another motionless
instant of contemplation. That is the ideal limit, the pure type
of reason conceived in the manner of Descartes.52
The difference between Maritain's notion of judgment and that
of Kant results from the fundamental difference with which we began,
namely, the difference between starting points of knowledge. Because
of Kant's "de-relation" of the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, there
is no possibility in his system of returning to the noumenal world for
the verification of concepts. Judgment thus becomes for Kant a synthe-
51Maritain, The Dream of Descartes, p. 24.
52Jacques Maritain, Three Reformers:  Luther,  Descartes,
Rousseau, (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 197017pp. 59-60,
TiGlics mine).
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sis of concepts. When I make the judgment expressed by the statement
"this page is white," the judgment consists of the synthesis of the
concepts expressed by the words "page" and "white." There is no re-
ference in this judgment to the actual conditions of the noumenal world.
This position is in obvious contrast with Maritain's notion of judg-
ment in which judgments cannot be made without the involvement of that
which is other than the knower as the criteria used in judgments.
We can now understand that, according to Maritain's critical
realist solution to the problem of knowledge, conceptualization, pro-
per to knowledge in general, begins with, or has its starting point
in, things other than the knower from which a thing as object becomes
part of the intellect in intentional existence, and finally this in-
telligibility moves back toward things other than the knower by —cans
of judgments concerning the conformity of concepts with things other
than the knower Thu, an account of knowledge has been given in
which being other than the knower cannot be discarded, and in which
knowledge is knowledge of being other than the knower.
CHAPTER III
THE DIVISIONS OF THE SPECULATIVE SCIENCES
In the last chapter we examined Maritain's critical realism as
a critique of knowledge in general, and as such, this was seen to in-
volve primarily an account of the formation of concepts. We emphasized
in this account the role that extramental being played in the forma-
tion of the concept, namely, as the starting point and the point of
verification of knowledge. In the present chapter we shall consider
the various ways in which being can be known scientifically. We shall
consider the various kinds of knowledge of being that can be acquired
through systematic scientific inquiries.
All scientific knowledge presupposes the solution to thQ pro-
blem of knowledge as explained in the last chapter. Simply stated,
this solution involved the recognition of "the existence of things
outside the mind and the possibility of the mind's attaining these
things and constructing within itself and by its own activity, begin-
ning with the senses, a knowledge which is true or in conformity with
what is."' In the present chapter we will see this solution as it
is formulated in terms of the different kinds of knowledge proper to
the various speculative sciences.
Also in this chapter, in accord with one of the previously ex-
plained interests of this thesis, we shall see the place of modern sci-




ence E. ong all of the speculative sciences. This placement of the ex-
perimental sciences will be understood through the distinction between
the experimental sciences and the philosophy of nature, or more speci-
fically, through the distinction between the kinds of knowledge pro-
per to each.
The distinction was made in the preceding chapter between for-
mal abstraction and total abstraction. We are here concerned with the
knowledge acquired by means of formal abstraction. This kind of ab-
straction consists of three degrees which are the basis for the differ-
ences between the speculative sciences. That is, the knowledge offered
by the various speculative sciences can be distinguished according
to its degree of abstraction from extramental things. Thus, we shall
first consider the degrees of this formal abstraction. Then, on the
basis of these degrees, we shall distinguish between the speculative
sciences which inquire into the diversities of being purely for the
sake of knowledge of such.
The De2rees of Abstractios
Various objects of knowledge possess different degrees of in-
telligibility. These degrees of intelligibility are in accord with the
degrees to which the objects of knowledge can be abstracted and thus
freed from the matter which individuates them in their actual existence.2
2It must be noted here already, that this does not imply the
total lack of involvement of matter in all abstracted objects of know-
ledge. There remains in some (namely, those of the first degree of ab-
straction) what Aquinas called "undesign2ted matter." As Maritain states:
"The mind can consider objects abstracted from, and purified of, mat-
ter but only to the extent that matter is the basis of diversity amongst
individuals within a species, i.e., insofar as matter is the princi-
ple of individuation. In this way, the object remains; and remains
to the very extent that it has been presented to the intellect, im-
pregnated with all the notes coming from matter, and abstracts only fro,r,
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Along this line, three degrees of abstraction can be distinguished.
First, the mind can conceive of things which cannot actually
exist apart from matter, and in the mind's conception of such things
it can be the case that matter is not excluded. A conceiving, of
things Wiich cannot exist without matter, and which includes matter,
does not include matter in the same way as the actually existing things
include matter. When the thing as conceived, or as known, is abstracted
from the thing which actually exists, it is abstracted from "that in
actually existing things which insulates each within itself and makes
it to be, as it is in fact, other than every other concrete existent,"
i.e., it is abstracted from "'singular sensible matter.'"3 Or to use
Aquinas' term, it is abstracted from designated matter. This does not
mean that matter is not involved in any way in the conception of such
things, for matter is involved as "'universal sensible matter,"4 or
as undesignated matter. This undesignated matter is not this or that
particular matter, but is matter which refers to the "singular sensible
matter" of actually existing things inasmuch as the concept refers to
various particular things. In the first degree of abstraction, the
mind abstracts its object from designated matter but not from undesig-
nated matter. With this explanation of the manner in which matter is
included in the conception of actually existing things which cannot ex-
ist without matter, the first degree of abstractlon can be described as
follows. It is the degree of abstraction by which the mind conceives of
bodies in their mobile and sensible reality, bodies garbed in their
the contingent and strictly individual peculiarities, which science over-
looks." Ibid., p. 35.
3FitzGerald, "Maritain's Critical Realism," p.82.
4Ibid., p.
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empirically ascertainable qualities and properties. Such an ob-
ject can neither exist without matter and the qualities bound up
with it, nor can it be conceived without matter. It is this great
realm that the ancients called Physi_c_a knowledge of sensible na-
ture, the first degree of abstraction.b
This first level of abstraction however does not exhaust the
scientific intelligibility of extramental sensible things. The mind
can also abstract from sensible thinas various properties of things
which can be conceived without undesignated matter. These properties
are, what may be called, mathematical entities. Maritain states that
through such abstraction the mind "considers nothing more than a cer-
tain property which it isolates within bodies--a property that remains
when everything sensible is left aside--quantity, number or the exten-
ded taken in itself."5 Thus in the area of mathematics, objects of
thought such as a point or a line, are abstracted from things which can-
not exist without matter. The concepts themselves, however, do not in-
clude matter.
Finally the mind can abstract from existing sensible things an
intelligible part of such things which can either exist as part of
such sensible things, or a!, part of imraterial things; and as conceived,
such objects of knowledge do not include matter. "These are objects of
thought which not only can be conceived without matter, but which can
even exist without it, whether they never exist in matter, as in the
case of God and pure spirits or whether they exist in material as well
as in immaterial things, for example, substance, quality, act and po-
tency, beauty. goodness, etc. "7 Such objects of thought can be grouped




under the heading of "being as such and its laws." lhus, that which
is abstracted to become actually intelligible by way of the third de-
gree of abstraction is that by which things simply are, i.e., "the very
being with which they are saturated."8 Such intelligibilities compose
the realm of metaphysics which considers being as being.
As briefly indicated in the preceding paragraphs, each of
these three degrees of abstraction, or degrees to which objects of
knowledge can be abstracted from extramental things, produces a differ-
ent level of intelligibility or 'universe of intelligibility" from that
which is potentially intelligible in extramental things, or in the trans-
objective subjects. On the basis of these levels of intelligibility,
divisions among the speculative sciences can be made by distinguishing
the various aspects or modes of being which are inquired into by the
various sciences.9
The first degree of abstraction produces an intelligible "uni-
verse of the principles and laws of sensible and mobile nature, or the
world of Physica. That is, that which becomes intelligible by way
of the first degree of abstraction is sensible nature, and what is known
2Ibid.
-Contrary to these Thomistic divisions among the sciences,
which are based on the diversity of that which can be known of existing
things, Descartes combined all sciences into one science because for him
things and their diversity did not determine what could be known. That
is, since the "domination of' the object over our minds" was rot present
in Descartes, but rather since the acts of the intellect were that which
Was known, knowledge depended merely on the human intellect. Consequent-
ly, all scientific inquiries could be considered unified. This combin-
ation of the ,iarious sciences into one science also implies a "single
and identical degree of abstraction and of intelligibility for every-
thing that we can know." Naritain, The Dream of Descartes, p. 48-9.
1 • •°Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 137.
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can actually exist only in sensible things. Maritain calls this the
universe of the "sensible real."11 That which is known through the sec-
ond degree of abstraction is a certain property of extramental things
in all its variation, namely, "Quantity as such according to the rela-
tions of order and measure proper to it..12 This is the universe of
the "praeter-real,"13 or that of mathematics. Finally, the mind can
bring to intelligibility through the third degree of abstraction "ob-
jects which are conceived as ordered to that supreme value which is ex-
tramental existence but which can be realized in a non-sensible, non-
empirical existence..14 In other words, that which is known of ex-
tramental things by way of the third degree of abstraction is that by
which those things are, i.e., being itself, and this object of know-
ledge is and can also be actualized in immaterially existing things.
This is metaphysical knowledge or "knowledge of that which is beyond
sensible nature" and is called the "trans-sensible" universe.15 Thus,
through the various degrees of abstraction, we can bring to intelligi-
bility different aspects of that which extramentally is, or different
aspects of the existing trans-objective subject.
We can now further examine Maritain's consideration of the na-
ture of the inquiries which are made by the various sciences into the
diversities of being. We shall, within the first degree of abstraction,





15Ibid., PP. 36 .1 137'
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the philosophy of nature. The importance of this distinction relates
mainly to those philosophers involved in the philosophy of science and
to scientists who wish to make ontological claims. Further importance
can be attributed to this distinction in view of the consequences which
result if this distinction is recognized generally, namely, the dimin-
ishing of the belief in the ultimateness of modern science. In other
words, this distinction is fundamental to the recognition of the pro-
per epistemological perspective of the experimental sciences; and it is
thus fundamental to the rejection of the ontological claims (notably
materialism and mechanism) which arise out of an exaggeration of the
epistemological place of modern science. We shall then deal with a
distinction, (along lines different than that of abstraction) between
perinoetic intellection proper to the experimental sciences and dia-
noetic intellection proper to the philosophy of ndture and metaphysics.
This will lead to the important distinctions between the philosophy of
nature and metaphysics insofar as they both deal with the transobjective
intelligible. Finally, and in connection yet with the distinctions be-
tween the philosophy of nature and metaphysics, we shall conclude our
examination of the various scientific inquiries into the diversities
of being with an examination of another kind of intellection proper to
metaphysics, namely, knowledge of being by analogy or ananoetic intel-
lection, part of which includes metaphysical knowledge of God.
Experir-ental Sciences  and Philosophy of Nature
Empiriological Knowledge and Ontological Knowledge
Within the first degree of abstraction and its corresponding
universe of intelligibility of things, two different kinds of knowledge
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are to be distinguished. Knowledge of the sensible real can be dis-
tinguished into two classes or catagories depending on what it is about
the sensible real that is known. One kind of knowledge of the sensible
real not only depends upon what is sensible for its concepts but also
the concepts are only those which are concerned with the sensibleness
of the sensible real. On the other hand, tnere is a kird of knowledge
of the sensible real in which the concepts refer to the first causes
or principles of (in general, the modes of being exhibited by) sensi-
ble things. These two different kinds of knowledge of the sensible
real are called empiriological knowledge and ontological knowledge of
such, respectively, and the distinction between the two deserves our
further examination. The former knowledge is that of the experimental
sciences (science in the modern sense of the term) and the latter know-
ledge is that of the philosophy of nature. It is between these two
disciplined inquiries into the sensible real that much of the contem-
porary conflict between philosophy and science takes place. Much of
this general conflict concerns the propriety of a philosophy of nature
in view of the enormous amount of knowledge of the sensible real ac-
quired by the experimental sciences. Thus, we must take note of the dis-
tinctions between these two kinds of know!edge, and we shall do so with
a view particularly sensitive to the legitimacy of the kind of knowledge
of the sensible real which the philosophy of nature offers.
One way of conceptualizing and analyzing the sensible real is
that of an empiriological explanation of such. Such an explanation is
not concerned directly with the being of sensible being, but rather, the
concern here is with sensible being as sensible. Being is yet consid-
ered as the object of the intellect but it is considered implicitly as
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the mere foundation of observable and measurable phenomena. The con-
cepts employed here refer to "sensible observations and indicate some-
thing which presents certain well-determined observable properties."16
In other words, all the concepts used ir an empiriological explanation
of sensible being "belong strictly to the order of what falls, or might
have fallen or should be able to fall within the experience of the sen-
ses."17 The concepts of an empiriological explanation are "resolved"
in the sensible and observable as such. The resolution of the concepts
is "descendant towards the sensible, toward the observable as such, in-
sofar as it is observable. Not of course that the mind no longer re-
fers to being, for that is quite impossible: being always remains; but
here it enters the service of the sensible, of the observable and es-
pecially of the measurable."18 An example of the deseendance to the
sensible in empiriological explanation which has been given by Yves
Simon may help to clarify the concern with and the dependence upon the
sensible or 1-.;- e observable in such an explanation. The example is that
of an empiriological explanation of man.
ror the zoologist, man is a mammal of the order of Primates. How
would he define such a term as mammal? A vertebrate character-
ized by the presence of special glands secreting a liquid called
milk. Hew is milk defined? In terms of color, taste, average
density, biological function, chemical components, etc.




J3cques Maritain, Phi:1ps9jaht. of_Nature, (New York: Philosophi-
cal Library, 1951), pp. 74-5. It can be pointed out here, in anticipa-
tion of a future section, that this analysis remains on the level of
resolving its concepts in the observable even though that which is ob-
servable may be translated into objects of thought which cannot be imag-
ined--as is the case in contemporary physieo-mathematical knowledge.
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datum; it is the object of an intuition for which no logical con-
structicn can be substituted and upon which all the logical con-
structions of the science of nature finally rest. . . . Every
concept is meaningless for the positive scientist which cannot
be, either directly or indirectly, explained in terms of sensa-
tions.19
The other way of analyzing the sensible real is an analysis
that is not oriented to the observable as such, but rather is oriented
to the being of the sensible real. This is an ontological analysis or
explanation of the sensible real. The concepts of an ontological ex-
planation do not refer to the sensible or observable as such, but they
do refer to the beilg of the sensible thing. The concern here (in the
philosophy of nature) is the nature of the thing and the reasons for
its being. Such an analysis seeks to bring to intelligibility the es-
sence of the things composing the sensible real.20 It could also be
said that the formal object of ontological knowledge is the bein: of
the sensible real. In terms of the object of knowledge, Maritain de-
fines the philosophy of nature as a "knowledge whose object, present
in all things of corporeal nature, is mobile being as such and the on-
tological principles which account for its mutability," i.e. it is
a knowledge of the world of "changing being. P21 The philosophy of
nature deals with the being itself of the sensible real, i.e., it deals
with being insofar as it is mutable and mobile.22 Concepts which offer
an ontolooical explanation of sensible being are "resolved" in intel-
19Ibid., pp. 165-6.
20We cannot attain this intelligible essence apart from sense
experience as an angel can. Maritai, Philcsphy of Nature, p. 85.
21Maritain, The .)_egrees of Knowledge, p. 176.
22Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, p. 91.
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ligiblc being. The resolution of the concepts involved here is "ascen-
dant toward intelligible being, in which the sensible is always present
4 and plays an indispensable role but does so indirectly: putting it-
self in the service of intelligible being and as connoted by it."23
The example of Yves Simon, this time giving an ontological explanation
of man, will hopefully again produce greater clarity concerning the
ascension of an ontological explanation to its ultimate term in the
being of the sensible real.
To the question what does the word man mean? the answer will be
'rational animal'; now, none of the elements of this definition
presents a character of irreducible clarity. Take one of them,
for instance, animal. What does this word mean? A correct de-
finition would be: 'a living body endowed with sense knowledge,'
and these are so many terms which badly need clarification. Take
one of them, for instance, 'living. T would say that a body is
a living one when it moves itself, when it is the active origin of
its own development. If we go any step farther, we go beyond the
limits of physical thought. In order to render the idea of life
clearer, we would have to define it as self-actuation. The con-
cept of self-actuation does not imply any reference to the pro-
per principles of corruptible and observable things: it is a meta-
physical concept. Its elements are identity and causality. Iden-
tity is the first property of being. Causality can be analyzed
into potency and act. Identity, potency, and act are so many con-
cepts directly reducible to that being, which is, in an absolute
sense, the first and the most intelligible of all concepts. We
have reached the ultimate term of the analysis, the notion which
neither needs to be nor can be defined and which does not admit
of any beyond.24
It was mentioned above that even though the concepts of an on-
tological explanation are resolved in the being of the things of the
sensible real, such conceptualizations do involve the sensible, "but
indirectly ahd at the service of intelligible being."25 It is at this
23Ibid., p. 74.
24Ibid., pp. 164-5.
?5Maritain, The Durees of  Knowleq_e_, p. 148.
•••
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point that a subtle distinction must be made concerning the involve-
ment of the sensible in an ontological explanation. Such an explana-
tion is bound to the realm of the sensible in that the objects of
ontological knowledge of the sensible real are "characterized by means
of experienced sensations."26 That is, the formal cbjects of knowledge
in this analysis are intelligibilities which are found, or are poten-
tially intelligible, in the sensible real. However, the formal objects
of knowledge here, as they are intelligible, are not representations
of something which could be sensed. Maritain states that "its object
precisely as intelligible is not sensed; as intelligible (intelligible
for us) it implies a reference to the senses but it is not sensed, it
is not an object of observation. '27 Thus are formed such concepts as
'corporeal substance, quality, operative potency, material or formal
cause, etc.--notions which, while they bear reference to the observable
world, do not designate objects which are themselves representable to
the senses and expressible in an image or a spatio-temporal scheme..28
The fact that the formal objects of ontological knowledge refer
to that which cannot actually exist apart from being sensible (or a-
part from matter) satisfies one requirement of such concepts being de-
rived through the first degree of abstraction, namely, that that which
is knoi,di cannot exist apart from matter. But what about the other re-
quireme:lt, namely, that that which is known cannot be conceived apart
from matter? How is it possible that the objects of ontological know-
ledge of the sensible real as they are intelligible are not something
26Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, p. 80.
271bid.
28Maritain, The Durees of Knowledge, p. 148.
49
which could be sensed and yet are such that matter is not excluded
from them? The answer to these questions lies in the fact that undesig-
nated matter does not have to be such that it is part of an imaginable
representation of some actually existing thing which includes singular,
particular matter. That is, the conceptions involved in ontological
knowledge do not include universal undesignated matter in an imaginable
manner. For example, concepts such as corporeal substance, form, and
quality cannot be conceived apart from matter even though matter is
not a part of them in an imaginable, representative way. Form is al-
ways thought of as form of matter; quality, similarly, as quality of
corporeal substance.29 Thus it is that the concepts of an ontological
explanation of the sensible real do not abandon the sensible while
giving an explanation of the sensible real in terms of its being.
29It can be pointed out here that since an empiriological aral-
ysis resolves its concepts in that which can be sensed, such concepts
include universal matter as part of imaginable representations of that
which is sensed, i.e., in a way such that the concept is a represen-
tation of a material object which can be sensed. (We can parenthetically
note that the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume--which limits knowledge
to imaginable constructs or models--does not include universal or un-
designated matter in ideas or images. Rather than maintaining that the
matter as such which is included in mental images remains undesignated
or not representative of this or that particular matter, empiricism
maintains that the matter which is included in mental images is repre-
sentative of some particular matter and becomes generally representative
through some other act of knowing or deciding that a particular image
should be generally representative. One result of this position is
that our imagas would be continuously changing subject to the mutability
of matter.) This might be objected to since modern physics (physicoe
mathematical knowledge) attains a mathematical transformation of such
concepts of the sensible real and results in the concepts in which
the sensible real is no lowjer represented in an imaginable ranner.
This objection can he answered however, by pointing out that such trans-
formations arc transformations of concepts whose ultimate term is yet
that which can be sensed and thus imaginably conceived.
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It can be seen then that modern science explains30 the sensible
real only in terms of concepts which refer to what can be sensibly ex-
perienced An empiriological analysis does not have the task of de-
termining what a thing is, or of determining the essence of a thing.
"A scientific [modern science] definition does not tell us what a thing
, but only in what way we can agree on the observations and measure-
ments we have taken from nature."31 To the extent that the concepts
in an empiriological explanation refer to the observable as such, or
indicate that which is or can be sensibly observable, such an expla-
nation of sensible being is free from an ontological explanation of
sensible being.32 On the other hand, an ontological explanation of the
30 1aritain's distinction between sciences of explanation and
sciences of observation--between deductive and inductive sciences--
can be noted here. (Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledat, pp. 32-4.)
Sciences of observation are only able to give an imperfect explanation
of the sensible real in that they do not give a certain explanation of
such, or they do not give an explanation of what is necessarily the
case regarding such things. One reason for this is that sciences of
observation do not deal with the essences of things, or the "intelli-
gible necess;ties" of things directly but only deal with essences of
things as hidden. The essences of things composing the sensible real
are merely implicitly present in an explanation of the sensible real
in terms of what is observable. They are implicitly present in such
explanations in that they have to be assumed to be present in (as the
"stablizing core" of) actually existing things in order for the things
to be explained in terms of their observabilities. Since, then, the
sciences of observation involve the intelligible necessities of things
only in this implicit manner, the explanations themselves offered by
such sciences are uncertain. On the other hand, sciences of observa-
tion give imperfect explanations of the sensible real, (imperfect in
view of their uncertainty) because of what they do deal with directly,
namely, that which is observable of the sensible real. Because the
sciences of observation are concerned merely with what is observable,
which is obviously mutable, the explanations offered by such sciences
are constantly subject to rfeision or complete substitution.
31Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 6.
32-Maritain does point out that an empiriological explanation of
sensible being is "bound to, or makes use of, the knowledge which is
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sensible real does not have set before it the task of collecting all the
observabilities of the sensible real. (This does not imply, as indi-
cated above,33 that in an ontological explanation the sensible is dis-
pensed with, for an "ontological analysis at the first degree of ab-
straction cannot be disengaged from the sensible given; it definitely
rests upon it."34 The being which is the object of knowledge here is
the being of the sensible real--mobile and changable beihk-- and such
being not only actually exists in sensible things, but also, as con-
ceived, it is the being of the sensible real, i.e., it cannot be con-
ceived apart from matter.)
A serious mistake, which is common in both modern science and
philosophy, is the failure to recognize that empiriological knowledge
and ontological knowledge are two different kinds of knowledge. This
failure is the reason for the common mistake of regarding an empirio-
the concern of an ontological explanation of sensible being. In an
empiriological analysis, even though knowledge of the being of sensible
being is not that which is sought after, being is yet assumed to be
the basis of the "spatio-temporal representations and empirical de-
finitions" of the sensible real which are formed in an empiriological
analysis. (Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, p. 79.) Maritain states
that the connection of an empiriological explanation to an ontologi-
cal one is "in an implicit, obscure, ungracious and unavowed fashion,
and [is] that for a two-fold reason: first, to the extent that these
sciences necessarily presuppose a philosophy or pre-philosophy, a
latent substructure which may be rudimentary, unformulated, unconscious,
but which is none the less real, and for which the existence of things
distinct from thought, and the possibility of attaining these things
more-or-less completely by knowledge, are indisputable postulates; and
then, to the extent that the science itself refers obliquely to the
being of things as the foundation for the explicative representations
that it elaborates." Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 154.
33See above, p. 49.
34Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, p. 85.
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logical explanation as the only explanation--and thus as an ontolog-
ical explanation--of the sensible real. Neither of these two different
kinds of knowledge are to be considered as a complete explanation of
the sensible real in themselves. Rather, they are to be considered
as complimentary to each other, since they are dealing with the same
ma*--ial object--the sensible real. It is particularly relevant in
connection with modern science to notice that empiriological knowledge
is an insufficient or incomplete explanation of the sensible real, and
that it is not exclusive of an ontological explanation of such. That
is, it is a mistake to make an ontological claim (most notably that of
mechanism and materialism) on the basis of an empiriological explana-
tion of the sensible real.
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What is needed, in addition, is a know-
35A rather striking example of this mistake can be found :n
the behavioristic trend in modern psychology. The claim of behavior-
ism which maintains the possible reduction of an explanation of man
to an explanation in terms only of what is observable concerning man
(namely, a material body and its patterns of behavior) merely points
out (and points out rather well) that such an explanation is complete-
ly oriented to and resolves its concepts in what is observable. (I
use the term "observable" here only for the purpose of authenticity.
The expression which would clarify the intended meaning here is "sen-
sible.' Thus that which is observable concerning man, is intended
merely to mean that which is sensibly observable concerning man; and
also the resolution of concepts is in the sensible.) The serious mis-
take comes with the assumption that this reduced explanation of man is
the exclusive--the sole, the most fundamental, the most truthful--
explanation of man. With this assumption the ontological claim that
man is a body possessing some patterns of behavior is also present.
Furthermore, the reason for this assumption is an assumed materialism.
It is assumed that a materialistic explanation is the most fundamental
explanation of all. This points out that an empiriological explana-
tion such as behaviorism does not prove the ontological claim of mate-
rialism, but rather that an assumption of materialism need he made in
order to justify the claim of materialism on the basis of an empirio-
logical explanation. (A common defense of the legitimacy of an onto-
logical explanation of sensible being is that there are some sensible
things which will never be able to be fully explained in terms of the
observable, e.g., the complexities of the human brain. This defense
however also involves the assumption, however implicitly, that a mate-
rialistic explanation is the most fundamental explanation of the sen-
sible real.)
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ledge of being itself in connection with the sensible real--"a knowledge
of corporeal, sensible and mobile being, of the being immanent in those
realities of nature in which the sciences of phenomena reach their ter-
minus and find their verification, those realities which constitute
the basis of all their [empiriological] conceptual constructions, and
over which these constructions give us practical mastery..36 We shall
consider this mistake of regarding empiriolcgic - 1 knowledge as onto-
logical knowledge of the sensible real in connection with one specific
kind of empiriological knowledge--physico-mathematical knowledge--in
order to understand further why an empiriological knowledge of the sen-
sible real does not exclude an ontological knowledge of such.
Physico-mathematical Knowledge
The other truth which Marl tam attributes to Descartes, ef which
we spoke earlier,37 is that of a realization of the possibilities of
a mathematical explanation of the sensible real.38 This realization
has been greatly developed since Descartes into what Maritain calls
"physico-mathmatical" knowledge. Such knowledge is an empiriological
kind of knowledge which interprets the sensible real mathematically.
This knowledge can also be called "empiriometrical" knowledge. 39 In
this particular kind of empiriological knowledge the resolution of con-
cepts becomes the measurable rather than, more generally, the observable.
36 1aritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, D. 174
37See above, p. 16.
38Maritain, The  Dream of Descartes, p. 35.
30 •
'Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, p. 104, see also, Maritain,
The  De.,grees of Knowledge, p. 1487.
As Simon states:
It is comparatively easy to see how the law of the descen-
ding analysis which prevails in all fields of positive knowledge
applies to the mathematical interpretation of nature. Whereas
in the case of a non-mathematical positive science the law of de-
scending analysis amounts to the necessity of resolving all con-
cepts into observable data, this law, when applied to a science
of physico-mathematical type, signifies the necessity of resolving
all concepts into measurable data. Nothing makes sense for the
positive scientist in general except what can be explained in
terms of observations. Nothing makes sense for the physico-mat1N-
matician except what can be explained in terms of measurements.4u
Empiriometrical or physico-mathematical knowledge is not to
be considered as a purely mathematical knowledge even though it gives
a mathematical interpretation of the sensible real. The reason for
the difference is the following. In mathematical knowledge the point
of verification of its concepts is not the sensible real. It does not
need to return to the sensible real to verify its conclusions after
its concepts have been abstracted from the sensible real.
The ancients taught that in mathemaLics the judgment—whereby
knowledge is perfected--does not open upon the sensible, but upon
the imaginable. This does not mean that each of the conclusions
it establishes must be directly verified in imaginative intuition.
They must be verified in it either directly or analo2ically. That
is to say, they either can be constructed in imaginative intui-
tion, or they belong to a system of notions . . . stemming from
one which may be constructed in intuition, Al. . and in which
they may find an analogical interpretation."
Physico-mathematical knowledge, on the other hand, does return to the
sensible real for the verification of its concepts. It is physical in
that it verifies its judgments in the physical. Physical reality and
physical causes are the "terminus of its investigation."42 Thus the
mathematical translations of the sensible real which compose physico-
40Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, pp. 175-6.
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mathematical knowledge are subject to change on the basis of future
observations of the sensible real. Basing itself on th2 sensible real
then, physico-matherratical knowledge offers a "mathematization of the
sensible." The material object of this knowledge is the sensible real,
and the formal object is mathematical. Such knowledge always remains
a knowledge of the sensible real given in terms of the mathematical
praeter-real. "Thus, they [physico-mathematicians] have more affinity
with mathematics than with physics as to their rule of explanation
and yet at the same time are more physical than mathematical as to
the terminus in which their judgments are verified."43
The mistake of giving physico-mathematical knowledge an ex-
aggerated position in the structure of human knowledge began already
with Descartes. He wished to apply the certitudes peculiar to mathe-
matics to all of science. The easy mistake which has often followed
from this desire is to consider such knowledge as being an exclusively
truthful explanation of the physical real and thus to think that the
physical real is only truthfully understood when it is measured by in-
struments and then quantifiet When this mistake is made the assump-
tion is present that knowledge of the sensible real in terms of mathe-
matical formulas gives an exclusive explanation of what the sensible
real is. Thus, there is the assumption here that the sensible real is
to be understood only in terms of that which can be measured and quan-
tified. If th s is the case then it can also be claimed that that
which is real in the sensible real is nothiny more than what is measur-
able and quantifiable. If this claim is made, a claim of materialism
(which is basic to mechanism) is also made since that of the sensible
43Ibid., p. 138.
real which can be understood in terms of measurement and quantification
is only its sensibleness or its sensibility which inheres in the matter
of the sensible real. Thus the claim is made that the sensible real
can be understood only in terms of its material, and if this is the
case then it must also be the case that the sensible real is nothing
more than material. As Maritain states, "the central error of modern
philosophy in the domain of the knowledge of nature has been to give the
value of an ontological explanation to the type of mechanist attraction
immanent in physico-mathematical knowledge, and to take the latter for
d philosophy of nature. It is not a philosophy of nature..44 For ex-
ample, in the area cf biology there are bio-physicists who proclaim a
"physico-mathematical biology, a biology which will tend ultimately to
offer a mathematical interpretation of sensible data."45 The mistake
here is to permit the physico-mathematical explanation in biology to
lead to a "Pseudo-ontology, to the closed world of mathematicism with its
pretensions of giving a total explanation and reconstruction of the real.
Even though this bio-mathematical discipline irpply [sic] a tendency to
mathematicism or mechanism, this tendency will remain inefficacious, pre-
cisely because this part of biology could never constitute an autonomous
whole."46
If the mistake of exaggerating the position of empiriological
knowledge in the structure of human knowledoe (by considering such krow-
ledge to be ontological knowledge) is not made, then room is left in the
411bid., p. 1c4
45Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, p. 114.
461bid., p. 115.
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universe of the first degree of abstraction for an explanation of
the sensible real in terms of its being. Indeed, recognition of this
mistake allows for the recognition of the necessity of an explanation
of that which makes possible the existence of the things which are ex-
plained in terms of their sensibilities by an empiriological analysis.
Dianoetic and Perinoetic Intellection
In the ldst section we touched on the fact that the knowledge
offered by the philosophy of nature is knowledge of the essences of
sensible things, whereas the knowledge offered by the experimental sci-
ences is knowledge which concentrates on the sensible of sensible things
and the essence of such remains hidden. This distinction can be ex-
panded to the distinction between "perinoetic intellection" and "dia-
noetic intellection," which distinguishes the knowledge of specuative
philosophy in general from the knowledge of the experimental sciences.
It is fitting that for an intelligence that makes use of sen-ses there correspond, as naturally proportionate, object-essences
immersed in the sensible. That is why the scholastics said thatthe essences of corporeal things are the connatural object of ourpower of intellection. Plunged into the ocean of the transobjec-tive intelligible our intelligence illumines material things in
order to reveal the hidden structure, and to actualize as much asit can the intelligibility detained in them in potency. And by
discourse it continually accomplishes new actuations of intelli-
gibility.
This "hidden structure," the essences hidden by matter, of the trans-
objective intelligible is what is known through dianoetic intellection.
The transobjective subjects are known to some degree 'in themselves,'"
and with the help of the senses. Because of the involvement of the
senses in the acquisition of knowledge of the essences of corporeal
things, such essences are not known "'by themselves,'" or immediately,
"like the non-discursive knowledge of the Angels or th perfectly im-
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mutable knowledge of God (or like the knowledge Descartes believed he
received from the clear and distinct ideas of thought and extension)."
Rather such essences are known by their accidents, i.e., "by dianoetic
intellection--where it is possible and to the extent that it is pos-
sible--we attain substantial natures 'in function of and through their
very manifestations, which are the accidents.'" Or, in other words,
dianoetic intellection offers "knowledge of essences (substantial) by
'signs' or accidents (properties) which manifest them, at least in
their most universal notes."47
In perinoetic intellection, on the other hand, the essences of
transobjective subjects remain hidden. This kind of intellection does
not offer knowledge of the essences in themselves, but rather merely
offers knowledge of indications, or knowledge of signs, of the essen-
ces. In perinoetic intellection
47Maritain, The Degrees  of Knowledge, pp. 202-6. Maritain also
distinguishes here between two "modes" of dianoetic intellection, namely,
that which is proper to philosophical knowledge and that which is pro-
per to mathematical knowledge. "In the first case, as was just recal-
led, the essence is known by the accidents. In the second, it is known,
so to speak straight away, by its very intelligible constitution, at
least insofar as the latter is manifested by means of signs which can
be constructed in some way in imaginative intuition. Right here arises,
with all its difficulties, the problem of mathematical intellection.
Mathematical essences are not grasped intuitively from within. That
would be proper to angelic and not human mathematics. Nor are they
perceived from the outside, which would be by accidents emanating from
them, as an operation emanates from an active potency and from a sub-
stance. Nor are they created by the human mind, of which they would
simply translate the nature and laws. We say that they are recognized
and deciphered so to speak, by means of a construction beginning with
primary eleents abstractively disengaged from experience  Such
an intellection is still 'dianoetic' (and not comprehensive, or exhaus-
tive) in this sense that the essence is not grasped ,intuitively by
itself (by means of a non-abstractive intuition which would exhaust
it at a glance) but indeed constructively by itself (thanks to a con-
struction of notions that is on the other hand at least indirectly imag-
inable and remains as it were an 'outside' by which the essence is at-
tained)."
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it is not knowledge by signs which manifest essential differences,
but by signs which are substitutes for those differences and are
known in place of them. This knowledge, to be sure bears on the
essence, grips it from the outside, but as it were blindly, with-
out being able to discern the essence itself or the properties in
the ontological sense of this word.
This knowledge is "knowledge of essences by the 'signs' which E. .re known
in place of the natures themselves, which in this case remain inacces-
sible in their formal constitutive."48
Philosophy 0  Nature and Metaphysics 
Having distinguished between the experimental sciences and the
philosophy of nature within the first degree of abstraction, and having
made a distinction between the experimental sciences and speculative
philosophy (philosophy of nature and metaphysics) with regard to that
which is known, the task that remains is to distinguish between the
philosophy of nature and metaphysics, and thus to defend the knowledge
proper to each as scientific knowledge.
The first and most obvious distinction between the philosophy
of nature and metaphysics is that they belong to two different uni-
verses of intelligibility beLause the knowftdge that is proper to each
is acquired by different degrees of abstraction. In the philosophy of
nature, that which is known (as it is known) is abstracted from indi-
viduating matter but is not abstracted from universal or undesignated
matter. Thus matter, undesignated matter, is included in the concepts
employed in the philosophy of nature. Or, that which is known in the
philosophy of nature cannot 1:e conceived without matter. That which
is known (as it is known) in metaphysics, on the other hand, is ab-
pp. 205 8, 206.
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stracted from all matter whatsoever. The concepts employed here do not
include matter.
A second distinction between these two kinds of inquiries in-
to the diversities of being is a distinction between the being which
is known by each. In both the philosophy of nature and metaphysics
the mind in its work of conceptualization, in the formation of concepts
and definitions, tends toward intelligible heing, seeks to grasp intel-
ligible heing."49 In accord with the fact that the concepts of the phi-
losophy of nature include matter, the being that becomes intelligible
here is the being of the sensible real. That which is known cannot
exist apart from matter. The object cf knowledge for metaphysics, on
the other hand, is being as such. It is not the particularized being,
being as mutable and mobile, of the philosophy of nature which is known
here. Rather, the being which comes to intelligibility in metaphysics
is "real being in all the purity and fullness of its distinctive intel-
ligibility--or mystery."5° In metaphysical knowledge we move to the
third degree of abstraction and consider being not as embodied in the
essences of sensible thing, but rather the object of such knowledge
is being as such. It is being disengaged and isolated from the sen-
sible quiddity, being viewed as such and set apart in its pure intel-
ligible values."51 That which is known here can be actualized either
with or without matter. This is only a preliminary or a very general
statement c) the distinction between the philosophy of nature and meta-
0
Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, p. 86.
50Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics, p. 50.
51Ibid., p. 26.
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physics with regard to that which is known, and we can proceed much
farther into the complexities of this distinction.
It has been pointed Gut that dianoetic intellection which is
proper to both the philosophy of nature and metaphysics offers knowledge
of essences of transobjective subjects. Since we are dealing here with
transobjective subjects, the essences which are known in the philosophy
of nature are those which are or can only be realized in material things,
and the essences which are known in metaphysics are those which are and
can be realized in material things. This does not mean, however,  that
the essences which are known are the same in both cases. They must be
distinguished in order to have metaphysical knowledge of that which is
and can be realized in material things. We shall point out two closely
related distinctions here.
The philosophy of nature, as we have said, offers knowledge of
the being of sensible being. This refers to the fact that what comes
to intelligibility in this case is what sensible things are, i.e., what
is known is the nature or essences of sensible things. What is known
is that which is essential to a thing being what it is.
52 Metaphysics,
on the other hand, offers knowledge of being as being. The essences
which come to intelligibility here are the essences of the existence
of things.53 In other words, the essences which are known in dianoetic
5?-The fact that knowledge of existence is here implicitly pre-
sent also is apparent in the phrase "being what it is." That is, even
though that which becomes actually intelligible is the "what" of a thing,
it is also implicitly known that the thing of which the "what" is known
is an existent--either actual or possible.
53The use of the plural (essences) will be understandable in
connection with the discussion of the analogous character of the con-
cept of being which is developed in metaphysics.
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intellection, as it is proper to metaphysics, is the being of things as
being. The nature or essence of the existence of things is the object
of thought in this case. It is now understandable why Maritain points
out that in the concept of being, developed or brought to intelligi-
bility in metaphysics, essence and existence cannot be separated;5/1 for
the essence which is known is the existence, the being as being , of
things.55
The second distinction between the essences of transobjective
subjects which are known by the philosophy of nature and metaphysics
is closely related to the distinction above. This distinction concerns
the analogous character of the concept of being55 developed in meta-
54
Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics, pp. 67-8.
55The existentialism of Maritain is obvious at this poin,.. It
is also obvious from the context, which brings out the contrasting know-
ledge of essences of sensible things, that Maritain's existentialism is
not in conform;ty with modern existentialists who emphasize the ex-
clusive importance of knowledge of being as existence.
56The phrase "concept of being" is intended to refer to meta-
physical knowledge as a whole which includes many more differentiating
intelligibilities (modes of being) than just the notion of existence
of things. For example, knowledge of the modes of being which every
thing has which has being (the transcendentals) are included in what
is referred to as the "concept of being," even though these universal
modes of being can be distinct objects of thought themselves. In other
words, what we will be referring to as the "concept of being" will in-
clude distinguishable intelligibilities which compliment the knowledge
that things are, and which in actual existence are identical with that
which is. Such intelligibilities are, for example, what are called
transcendentals. Maritain states the following concerning such intel-
ligibilities and their distinction from knowledge that things are and
their inclusion in knowledge of being as a whole. "There is a reality
which I attain in the Hotion of being, . . . and which I express by
the term being; and it becomes evident that their reality--even as
objectively nanifested by and in the notion of being—is richer and more
pregnant with intelligible values than the idea of being by itself im-
mediately reveals. By an intrinsic necessity it must in a sense over-
flow the very idea in which it is objectified.
"This is what I mean. You know that metaphysicians recognize
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physics, as opposed to the universal, generic or specific character
of the concepts employed in the philosophy of nature.
In accord with the fact that the knowledge offered by the phi-
losophy of nature is knowledge of the essences of things, the concepts
which are formed are conceptions of the generic or specific nature of
things composing the sensible real. In the philosophy of nature the
intellect
attains a universal object of concept communicable to all the in-
dividuals of the same species or of the same genus. And this is
called univocal, since, presented to the mind by a plurality of
transobjective subjects and restored to them in judgments, it is
purely and simply one and the same in the mind. Unum in multis,
it is an invariant without actual multiplicity, realized in several,
a certain number of universal modes of being, as universal as being it-
self, which are termed transcendentals (passiones entis). For example,
unity is being inasmuch as it is undivided. This is an aspect of being
which rises before the 71ind--namely its internal consistence. . . .
To the extent to which anything is, it is one. Truth is being inasmuch
as it confronts intellection, thought; and this is another aspect of
being, thus revealed, a new note struck by it. . . . An object is true--
that is to say conforms to what it thus says itself to thought, to
the intelligibility it enunciates--to the extent that it is. . . .
Then there is goodness, transcendental 2pod. Good is being inasmuch
as it confronts love, the will. Everything is gocd, metaphysically
good. I am not speaking of moral goodness. Everything is good, that
is to say, apt to be loved, to be an object of love, to the extent to
which it is.
"Hence each of these transcendentals is being itself apprehended
under a particular aspect. They add nothing real to it. How could they
add anything to being? Outside being there is but nonentity. They are,
so to speak, a reduplication of being for and in our mind. There is no
real distinction between being and unity, between being and truth, be-
tween being and good. They are 'convertible notions. The distinction
between these different intelligible infinities is merely conceptual,
though based on reality, a virtual distinction.
"You see, then, that of a single reality, of something 1::hich is
one and the same outside my mind, of something which precisely as being is
one, and good, of this single and unique reality which exists or is capable
of existing outside my mind I possess several ideas. The idea, the notion,
the ratio, the concept of being qua idea, differs from the idea of unity,
of truth, of goodness or good. I therefore possess many ideas which cor-
respond to a single and identical reality too rich, too fertile to enter
my mind by the medium of a single idea, nut even this primary idea, the
idea of being. We may say that being compels the concept of being to mul-
tiply diverse concepts and exceed itself." (Ibid., pp. 68-70.)
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and by that very fact positing among them a commJnity of essence."57
What is important to note here is that the concepts proper to the phi-
losophy of nature are "purely and .,imply one and the same in the mind."
That is, we have one concept which provides us with essential knowledge--
generic or specific knowledge--of a number of transobjective subjects,
and that which is known actually exists in those transobjective sub-
jects.
The concept of being developed in metaphysics, however, in-
cludes at once both multiplicity and unity. Let us first consider its
multiplicity. The multiplicity involved in the concept of being is
a result of the diversity of its actual realizations, i.e., that which
is known in this case (being and its universal modes) actually exists
in diverse ways; it is "everywhere found in essentially different forms.
As Maritain states:
But in the perception of the transcendentals, we attain in a na-
ture more than itself, an object of concept not only transindi-
vidual, but trans-specific, transgeneric, transcategorical, as if
in opening a blade of grass one started a bird greater than the
world. let us call such an object of concept superuniversal.
The scholastics call it analogous, that is to say realized in di-
verse ways but according to similar proportions in the diverse sub-
jects in which it is found. It differs essentially, even as object
of concept, from the universal, not only because it has a greater
amplitude, but also and primarily—and this is what is most impor-
tant, because it is not like them purely and simply one and the
same in the mind (let us say monovalent)--it is polyvalent, it
envelops an actual multiplicity; he bird we spoke of a moment
ago is at the same time a flock."
The concept of being--the analogue--thus includes the diversity of the
ways in which it is realized in various transobjective subjects—the
57Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge., p. 212.
58Maritain, A Preface to MetaRhysics, p. 66.





diversity of its analogates. The diversity of the analogates in which
the analogue is realized, is included in the analogue itself because
the analogue is not completely abstracted from the analogates. "It
[the concept of being] would be purely and simply one if its differen-
tiations were not still itself, or to put it otherwise, if the ana-
logue presented to the mind made complete abstraction from its ara-
logates; if I could think being without thereby rendering present to
my mind (whether I am de facto explicitly aware of this or not is quite
accidental) in essentially different ways some of the others in which
this object of concept is realizable outside the mind..60 Maritain
concludes that "the concept of being is therefore implicitly and ac-
tually multiple. This is so because it only makes incomplete abstrac-
tion from its analogates, and in contrast to universal concepts it en-
velops a diversity which can be essential" to it.61
Even though the concept of being is not "purely and simply one
and the same in the mind,' even though it includes the diversity of
the ways in which it can be realized, it must in some way he a unified
concept if t is to be intelligible. "It would be purely and simply
multiple if it did not transcend its differentiations, or, to put it
otherwise, if the analogue presented to the mind made no abstraction
60 •Ibid., p. 213.
61 •Ibid. Because the objects of thought which are involved
in metaphysical knowledge of transobjective subjects can be realized
in oil possible transobjective subjects, and are realized in all ac-
tual transobjective subjects, they are termed "trans-sensible" ob-
jects of thought. "For though they are realized in the sensible in
which we first grasp them, they are offered to the mind as transcending
every genus and every category, and as able to be realized in subjects
of a wholly other essence than those in which they are apprehended."
Ibid., p. 214.
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from its analogates: in which case the word 'being' would be purely
equivocal and my thought would fly to pieces; I could no longer think:
Peter is man and this colour is green, but only ah, an."62 In other
words, we do use one name to signify the diversities such as "is man,"
and "is green." "Being presents me with an infinite intelligible va-
riety which is the diversification of something which T can neverthe-
less call by one and the same name..63 Thus the concept of being is
unified even though it is not conceivable apart from its realized di-
versities; "it is one in a certain respect, insofar as it does make in-
complete abstraction from its analogates, and is disengaged from them
without being conceivable apart from them, as attracted towards, with-
out attaining, a pure and simple unity.
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The question now is what is
this "certain respect” in which it is unified? Or, how is it possible
for the diversified concept of being to be intelligible?
The key to these questions has already been given in the phrase,
"that is to say realized in diverse ways but according to similar pro-
portions in the diverse subjects in which it is found." Let us con-
sider what Maritain has to say in addition to this.
In analogy of proper proportionality one has to do with a con-
cept which is ANALOGICAL IN ITSELF ('knowing' said of sense and in-
',,ellect, 'being' said of the creature and of God), and which desig-
nates, in each of the subjects of which it is said, something made
known by the likeness between the relations. which one of these sub-
jects (sense) has to the term -lknowingTaesignated in it by that
concept, on the one hand, and the relation which the other subject
(intellect) has to that term (knowing) likewise designated in it
by the same concept, on the other hand. It i immediately evi-
62Ibid., p. 213.
63Maritain, A Preface to Mets_physics, p. 67.
"Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 213.
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dent that under these conditions (the concept being in that case
analogous of itself), an analogy of proper proportionality does
enable us to attain the thing analogically known in accordance
with what is property signified by the concept. In this case,
what is signified by the concept, inasmuch as it is one (even
though it is so only in a unity of proportiorality), is intrin-
sically and formally in each of the analogates.55
In other words, an analogical concept such as the concept of being
designates something in each of the transobjective66 subjects of which
,,. it is predicated, for example, of man, or of stone. This something
(being) which is designated in various transobjective subjects is
known by, or can be intelligible because of, the likeness which the
relation that being has to man bears to the relation that being has
to stone. That is, the various subjects (man, stone, etc.) of which
that which is known (being) is predicated, are similarly related to
that which is known, and that which is known is known because of these
1 similar relations. Thus, being comes to intelligibility by the anal-
ogous manner in which the subjects are related to it.
11
, !
to) the relation of man to being. The unity of the concept of being
telligibility, is a proportional unity. The proportionality here re-
fers to the proportional relations which the ubjects have to the term
(being). That is, stone is related to being in proportion to (not equal
1 
The unity of the concept of being, which makes possible its in-




I realize that Maritain's statement concerning analogy here in-
dudes all of metaphysical knowledcje and not just metaphysical know-
ledge which is proper to dianocLic intellection. However, I Jill re-
' 
strict my explication of metaphysical knowledge by analogy to transob-
:
jective subjects since we have not yet arrived at a consideration of
metaphysical knowledge of that which can exist apart from matter (which,
os will become apparent, is known by analogy with metaphysical knowledge
--knowledge of the being as such--of transobjective subjects).
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are proportional. It consists of the fact that the relationships of
subjects to being are similar.67 The unity of the concept of being,
4
4 then, is derived from the fact, for example, that man is related to
being as stone is related to being. As Maritain states:
It [the concept of being] is said to have a unity of proportion-
ality; the being, man, stands to its man-existence as the being,
stone, to its stone-existence, . . . It signifies, therefore, not
precisely one object, but a plurality of objects of which one
cannot be posited before the mind without dragging the others
along with it implicitly because they are all linked together in




In our consideration of knowledge of being as being, we have
so far only considered this metaphysical knowledge as it is knowledge
of the being as such of sensible subjects--subjects whif- are the re-
alizations of that which is known of them and which exist materially.
We have been dealing with knowledge which is proper to dianoetie intel-
lection, and we havr distinguished within that knowledge--knowledge of
the essences of transobjective subjects--the knowledge which is proper
to the philosophy of nature and the knowledge which is proper to meta-
physics. With regard to metaphysical knowledge, then, we have consi-
dered knowledge of being as such with regard to its material realiza-
tions.
Not all of the things, however, in which being as being is found
or is realized are material things, for that which is known by means of
the third degree of abstraction can exist either with or without matter.
67It should be noticed that it is not said that the proportions
are similar for this would be quantifying the relations in some way.
68
Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 214.
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In other words, analogates of the intelligible analogue which is the
concept of being proper to metaphysics can include matter or can exist
without matter. The former we have just considered. We shall now
briefly consider the latter which provides a further distinction be-
tween metaphysics and the philosophy of nature.
The analogates which include matter are the signs or the in-
dicators of the concept of being which is in turn realized in these ana-
logates. These analogates are sensible and thus are themselves the
indicators of their being as being.69 Analogates which do not include
matter, however, are not the basis of the knowledge of their being as
such. These latter analogates (the being as being of such) are known
by way of the analogates which do include matter. Or, they are known
in the latter [the analogates which do include matter] as in a mirror,
in virtue of the likeness it has with them. n70 [he likeness it has
with them is being as being. In other words, knowledge of analogates
which do not include matter are Known by analogy, or by "ananoetic in-
tellection."71 Maritain states that analooates which do not include
matter
are known, . . . intrinsically and properly designated, consti-
tuted as objects of intellection, but as it were at a distance
and not 'in themselves.' The ray of the intellect that attains
them has been refracted or reflected, and they always remain a-
bove the knowledge we have of them, superior to the grasps that
reach up to them, separated from our mind in the very act which
69We should keep in mind that that which is known is the being
as being of those_thinorsin which_beinlas,beipa_is realized. That which
is known is not being as being which is isolated or divorced from those
things in which it is actually realized.
70,maritain, The pegrees of Knowletp, p. 218, (italics mine).
71Ibid.
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unites it to them. This paradox is due to the fact that they are
attained in an object that another subject has rendered present 
to our intelligence and which being itself one of the analoqates,
one of the valences of an analogue, causes us to pass by the latter 
to those other anaIegates  that we do  rot attain in themselves./ 
To expand on what is emphasized in the above, we can say that those ana-
logates which do not include matter become intelligible through intel-
ligible being as being which itself has become intelligible in terms
of an analogate which does include matter. The analogate which does in-
clude matter, because it is an analogate of being as being, causes us
to go beyond intelligible being as being, to a knowledge of analogates
of being as being which do not include matter. This universe of intel-
ligibiiity composed of analogates of being as being which do not in-
clude matter is called the universe of the "transintelligible."73 It
is called such not because it is unintelligible to us, but because there
is more that is potentially intelligible in it than our human intel-
lects can acquire and make actually intelligible.
One such analogate in the area of the transintelligible which
can be actually intelligible for us (by ananoetic intellection) only
in a manner which is wholly inadequate to the actuality of that ana-
logate, is perfect, or completely actual Being.
Metaphysical Knowledge of God
In this brief explication of analogical knowledge of God, we
shall follow Maritain's description of "one of the typical paths" which
reason may take in approaching and inadequately acquiring knowledge of
God.74 rhis path makes use of one particular me of being, namely, in-
72Ibid., p. 219, (italics mine).
73Ibid. 74Ibid., pp. 222-6.
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telligibility or thought.
Upon reflection it becomes known with certainty (to he who is
reflecting) that he is capable of having thoughts, and in fact that he
is thinking. "A philosopher thinks and grasps reflexively his own act
of thought. Here is a reality that has a certain ontological quality
or value and the existence of which hic et nunc is indubitable to him."
Furthermore, he is aware of the weakness of his thinking capability.
He is aware of the fact that in order to increase what is actually
intelligible for him he has to make use of a process called reasoning.7 -
All that is potentially intelligible for him is not innediately and
directly, intuitively, known by him. In Maritain's words,
this philosopher knows that his thought which is a mystery of
vitality to the world of bodies is at the same time a mystery of
debility in itself. For it is subject to error and to time, to
forgetfulness and to sleep, to distractions and to apathies More
still in its very structure it suffers conditions of servitude
hardly worthy of thought. It is not transparent to itself. It
beats against objects that remain obscure to it. It must needs
divide, compose, construct, logically elaborate data that are not
logical but real.
Recognizing this weakness in his ability to know, it also becomes evi-
dent that there are intelligibilities which are beyond his knowing ca-
pabilities. He does not know ard he cannot know all that is potential-
ly intelligible. If he did know all things he would be all things.76
And conversely, all of what he would be, would be all that is intelli-
gible; or all of what he would be, would be all intelligibilities,
75Even Descartes, who began with the incorrect assumption that
his clear and distinct ideas were immediately evident to him, (and thus
rejected the scholastic process of reasoning (sce above, p. 34)) recog-
nized the necessity of deducing the rest of what was to be known from
such ideas.
76It will be remembered that knowing is essentially being--as
taking unto oneself in the manner of intelligibility that which is known.
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(and thus he could only think of himself). If he were to be all things
by knowing all things he would be sufficient unto himself. However,
he does not know all that there is to know. He is not a unity of in-
telligibilities; his knowledge is not a unified knowledge. He only
knows various things. He is a fragmentation of intelligibilities.
He does not have the "privileges of pure thought." Since his know-
ledge not a unity of all intelligibilities, it is not sufficient
unto its.- if. "From the mcment that there are diverse things, no one
suffices unto itself to exist, otherwise it would be the all." Thus
his thoughts, his knowledge, is not self-sufficient because it is not
unified by knowing all things. Since it is not self-sufficient it de-
pends UH something else as the cause of its being.
In the case at hand, the philosopher may be said to experience
the non-sufficiency of his own thought unto itself. . . . but
he cannot think this non-sufficiency unto itself of his own thought
without knowing that his thought depends on another. It depends,
that is to say, not only on the material conditions that limit it
from below, but on a certain unknown from which it holds its very
actuality ard its being as thought, and which is itself, conse-
quently, thought or suprathought. In me, with me, it causes my
act of thought insofar as my thought has being. . . . There must,
therefore, be a thought which is thought, and which is the first
cause of my thought. From it must be excluded absolutely any re-
lation as a stuff or any material causality whatever with regard
to my thought. It is a cause which compenetrates with its pure
efficiency the whole being of my thought, and is absolutely sep-
arated in its essence from that same thought (which thus remains
really my thought). It is the absolutely uncaused Thought itself
which causes in me and with me my act of thought.
Furthermere, this uncaused, absolutely pure Thought which exists by
itself, 0e, is the height of perfection of all that there is,17 and
its e, ection is implied in its self-tufficient existence. "Abso-1 if'
/7-lhis should not be confused with an anthropomorphizing of
God, or the construction of an image of perfected beings.
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lutely self-sufficient for existing, it is pure act, and therefore
infinitely perfect; knowing that it exists, I deduce its infinite per-
fection from its aseity."78
Thus from the act of making thought the object of thought (which
essentially consists of being), and by proceeding with ananoetic intel-
lection, i.e., by proceeding on analogy with the recognition of the ac-
tuality of our thought (an analogate of the analogous concept of thought),
we have attained knowledge of another analogate of the analogue; and
this analogate is far superior in actuality to our knowledge of it.
As Maritain states, the ananoetic intellection here set forth
has necessarily involved raising to the pure state the analogous
and polyvalent object of concept thought. And the superior anal-
agate thus attained as absolute Thought infinitely surpasses the
concept of thought, since it is not only thought, but being
se, and every perfection belonging to the transcendental order;
and since it is all that in absolute simplicity and unity.
is what the analogous concept, thought, signifies; that and in-
finitely more.79
We have thus completed a brief sketch of the various modes of
being which can be the objects of knowledge proper to the respective
speculative sciences which seek to attain such knowledge. We have seen
that sensible being is the object of knowledge acquired by way of the
first degree of abstraction. The experimental sciences attempt to at-
tain knowledge of the sensible of sensible extramental things, and know-
ledge of the essences of such are only hinted at. The philosophy of na-
ture, however, deals directly with the essences (the being) of sensible
being. We have also seen that being as such is LL e object of knowledge





acquired by way of the third degree of abstraction. Metaphysicians
attempt to attain knowledge of the nature of the existence both of that
which exists (or can exist) with matter and that which exists (or can
exist) without matter. With regard to the latter, we have seen that
knowledge of the nature of the existence of that which exists without
matter includes metaphysical knowledge of God, whose essence is His
existence. Thus, we have followed Maritain's outline of the possible
ways of knowing the diversities of being. We must now turn from this
speculative knowledge of being, which is knowledge for its own sake--
oriented to truth--to practical knowledge, the purpose of which is to
determine the good of man and to direct him toward it, i.e., the pur-
pose of knowledge of being is no longer for its own sake but for the




In the preceding chapters we have considered speculative
knowledge. We have considered the various ways in which the specula-
tive sciences inquire into the diversities of being. That is, we have
considered the various kinds of knowledge which are proper to the var-
ious kind of speculative sciences. We have seen the major rossibili-
ties of speculative knowledge of what there is. The purpose of this
knowledge is contained in itself, i.e., it is acquired for its own sake.
Speculative philosophy considers intelligible structures and necessi-
ties of being; "it considers existence according to the intelligible
values which are realized in it."1
We turn in this chapter to a consideration of a kind of prac-
tical knowledge. The aim of practical knowledge is toward the con-
crete actions of man in his existence here and now. Practical know-
ledge seeks existence in order to produce it rather than to know it as
in speculative knowledge.2 The practic.al intellect acquires knowledge
which guides man in his actions. Practical philosophy considers hu-
man existence in terms of its concrete, historical, existential situa-
tion. It "comAders man and human existence from the point of view of
'Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom, (London: Geoffrey Bles,
Ltd., 1940), p. 108.
2Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics, p. 28.
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the concrete and historical movement which leads them to their end;
from the point of view of human acts which have to be posited here and
now, in conformity with their rule."3 It is directed toward the par-
ticular conditions of man's existence rather than toward the essences
or natures (whether specific and generic, or of existence itself)
realized in existents. Maritain explains the difference between specu-
lative knowledge and practical knowledge in the following way.
In the SPECULATIVE ORDER the mind, considering the world of
existence, evokes from this world universes of intelligibility
which are increasingly pure, increasingly detached from matter:
. . . Then, coming back to the world of existence considered as
such, the mind takes as its concern human action going on in that
world and philosophizing, this time in the PRACTICAL ORDER, seeks
to know) no longer for the sake of knowing but for the sake of
acting;4
In other words, speculative and practical knowledge differ with re-
gard to purpose. "It is by the ends they seek (to contemplate an ob-
ject, to do something) that the speculative and practical differ."5
Thus, practical knowledge cannot be reduced to speculative knowledge,
since the former has an area which is proper to it, namely, the area
of action. Knowledge of this order or area cannot be given as, or in
terms of, speculative knowledge.6
Within practical knowledge which deals with the field of human
actions, there is a further distinction to be made. This distinction
is between speculatively practical, practically practical, and pruden-
tial knowledge.
3Maritain, Science and Wisdom, p. 108.





Speculatively practical knowledge, the knowledge of moral phi-
losophy or ethics„ as the name indicates, speculative in one re-
spect and practical in another. Moral philosophy is speculative in
that it examines its object (human actions) in order to extract the
general principles or the "intelligible constitutives" of such; and
more importantly, it is speculative in that it attempts to formulate
the general principles which ouoht to be the foundation of acts.7
It is a science because it consists of determining or acquiring know-
ledge of proper and improper actions in general or knowledge of prin-
ciples of actions in order to direct actions, rather than simply direc-
ting particular actions. "In the speculatively-practical sciences, the
concepts preserve their naked value of abstraction and intelligibility."8
Furthermore, the truth of speculatively practical knowledge does not
depend on, or is not determined by, actions which actually are per-
formed; its "truth implies neither regulation by right appetite nor af-
fective motion."9 Truth in moral philosophy is concerned with knowing
as the foundation of directing actions. "Thus, in moral philosophy the
mode of wjence is not practical but speculative as to the  fundamental 
eqpipment of knowledge and as to the structure of notions and defini-
tions..10 On the other hand, moral philosophy is practical in that its. _
purpose is to direct action rather than merely to know. If this were
not the case, moral 7Dhilosophy would have to be considered one of the
lIbid., p. 457.
8Maritain, Science and Wisdom, p. 139.
9Maritain, fhe Degrees of Knowledge, p. 457.
10Ibid., p. 458.
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speculative sciences. In fact, however, it does not seek knowledge
of the general principles of action simply for the sake of knowing
them. gather it seeks knowledge of such for the purpose of directing
action. Maritain elucidates the speculative knowing and the practical
directing of moral knowledge as follows:
Moral philosophy proposes to regulate action from afar, and
therefore, to act from afar upon the will through knowledge it-
self. It is in view of this end that it organizes its materials
into a practical context and discovers the ontological articula-
tions which are concerned with action by adapting to its practical
end a conceptual equipment, to wit, those r.odes of defining and
judging which are typically speculative. . . .
. . . moral philosophy proceeds in a practical manner as to
its proper finalities, the conditions of its object, and, there-
fore, its proper law of argumentation; and that its mode remains,
nevertheless, speculative and explanatory as regards the general
or fundamental equipment of knowledge. From this aspect mural
philosophy is considcred strictly as philosophy or ,peculatively
practical knowledge. 11
At the "opposite end" of practical knowledge is what micht
De called the knowledge of prudence. The sole purpose of this know-
ledge is to direct actions. It is concerned completely with the con-
tingencies of man's existential situation in fulfilling its purpose
of directing actions. It is in no way concerned, as moral philosophy
is, with the organization of universal truths about such actions. Its
truth consists simply in the direction of actions itself. In pruden-
tial knowledge practical knowledge
comes in contact with the concrete and singular act to be done
here  and now, within the indefinite variety of contingent cir-
cumstances. In immediate contact with action, because imme-
diately regulative of action, right practical knowledge is no
longer what we call wisdom, scientific knowledge, because at
this level its object is not only a practical object to he done,
but that practical object taken in its very singularity, in its
relation with the ends actually willed by my incommunicable per-
son--and that is not an object of science. Right practical
llIbid., p. 456.
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knowledge, as the immediate regulator of action, is the virtue
of pruderNe. It judges and commands what is to be done here
and now.1
Practically practical knowledge does not analyze ideal and
actual human actions into their explanatory principles. It moves in
the opposite direction, so to speak. It moves toward the actions them-
selves in crder to direct them. Practically practical knowledge con-
sists of the formation of principles based on those established in mor-
al philosophy which apply to more specific areas of action. The pur-
pose here is to direct actions based on principles which are formulated
from the principles developed in moral philosopny and which relate to
the area of activity to be directed. Thus, it not only depends on mor-
al philosophy as the basis for the more specific principles it forms,
but also on prudential knowledge of concrete situations for the appli-
cability of its principles to the specific area of activity. With re-
gard to the truth of such knowledge, it consists in directing actions,
but based upon knowledge of the principles of such. Maritain says the
following concerning practically practical knowledge.
This is a science because even though it is much more particu-
larized than moral theology or ethics, even though it considers
the details of cases, it nevertheless moves within the univer-
sal and the raisons d'etre as within its proper object. But as
to the fundamental equipment of knowledge itself or as to the
structure of notions and definitions, its procedure follows a
wholly different mode than does ethics or moral theology. The
very method of science is reversed. The whole mode of science
here is practical. What does that mean? It means that there is
no question here of explaining and resolving a truth, even a
practical truth, into its reasons and principles. The quest_lon




The particular concern of this chapter is with speculatively
practical knowledge, or with moral philosophy. There are two purposes
for our concern here with this kind of knowledge which correspond to
the two general interests of this thesis.
It is often assumed that the knowledge of the experimental sci-
ences is the only knowledge, or is at least the most important knowledge,
which can be useful for the improvement or the good of the human condi-
tion. Or, in other words, it is often assumed that the knowledge of the
experimental sciences as it is technologically applied to the world of
things is the only knowledge which is needed in order to improve the
human condition. We should keep in mind, however, that the speculative
knowledge of the experimental sciences and the philosophy of nature
which, in part, deals with things which can perform actions, is differ-
ent from speculatively practical knowledge in that the former deals with
things which can perform actions purely for the sake of knowledge and
not for the sake of directing such actions. Furthermore, the applica-
tion of such speculative knowledge to the controlling of that which is
known cannot take place in the absence of moral knowledge concerning
what should or should not be controlled for the improvement of the hu-
man condition. It must be recognized then, that the speculative know-
ledge of the experimental sciences cannot be applied to the improvement
of the human condition without the supervision of moral knowledge.14
14Thaue,a when behaviorists, for e.Fmple, propose the directing
of huran behavior solely on the basis of their explanation of such in
terms of rewards and punishments, they must recognize that they are
stepping out of their proper realm, as behaviorists, and are entering
the area of moral knowledge, in which they must make decisions concer-
ning proper and improper behavior--decisions which can herdly be made
on the basis of the knowledge they are interested in acquiring. Fur-
thermore, the behaviorist's interest in the direction of human behav-
Thus, in order to again place the experimental sciences in their pro-
per epistt:mological Perspective, we must consider the realm of know-
ledge proper to practical philosophy, particularly, moral philosophy.
Corresponding to this purpose, the scientific nature of ethics must
become clear in order that ethics itself should not be regarded as
unable to offer certain knowledge relevant to human actions.
In previous chapters, we have dealt directly with our knowledge
of beirg and its diversities or various modes. Although the purpose of
practical knowledge is not the acquisition of knowledge for its own
sake, but rather is that of directing action, our concern for the in-
volvement or role of being in such knowledge will not be absent. In
our present discussion of Maritain's moral philosophy the other inten-
tion--the strictly philosophical purpose--is to discuss the involvement
or the role which knowledge of the Being of perfect Goodness has in the
knowledge of the actions of man in his existential situation. In other
words, the other purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relation that
knowledge of God (theological knowledge) nas to knowledge of man's ac-
ior according to their principles cf rewards and punishments involves
either the contention or the assumption that man is completely condi-
tioned by forces other than himself, or that he has no freedom of choice
regarding his actions. Since the purpose of moral knowledge is to di-
rect human action, or to choose certain actions as opposed to others,
if man's freedom of choice regarding his actions is denied, there would
be no need for knowledge concerning which actions are correct and which
actions are incorrect, i.e., there would be no need for moral knowledge.
But in fact there is a need for moral knowledge as the behaviorist him-
self admits by his interest in directing human actions. Thus on the one
hand, when the behaviorist becomes interested in directing human action
he becomes involved in the moral realm, i.e., he has to make moral deci-
sions concerning the correctness or incorrectness of actions in order to
determine which actions are to be performed and which are not. On the
other hand, when he becomes interested in directing human action according
to the principles of reward and punishment, in which it is assumed or con-
tended that man's actions are determined by rewards and punishments, he
denies the existence of the moral realm which of necessity requires the
involvement of freedom of choice.
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tions (moral knowledge). On both sides of the relation the involve-
ment of being is apparent; there is the perfect, all-knowing, uncreated
Being, or He who IS, and there is the existential situation of man in
which his actions occur.
We must begin by establishing the necessity of the involvement
of theological knowledge in knowledge of human actions. We shall then
consider what it is that theology contributes, and we shall conclude
with a consideration of the distinction between theological knowledge
of human actions (moral theology) and philosophical knowledge of hu-
man actions which relies on theological truth (moral philosophy ade-
quately considered). By way of this discussion, the possibility of
scientific moral knowledge, or the place of ethics as a science, will
become clear.15
The Inadequacy of Purely Philosophical
Moral KnowledRe
Moral Philosophy as Non-scientific
Purely philosophical moral "science," or a "science' 
16 of hu-
man actions which does not allow for the acceptance of theological know-
ledge, is left with essentially the same problem of knowledge which is
common to all other sciences, namely the problem of acquirinu truly sci-
15Natural or pre-philosophic moral knowledge--moral knowledge
"of the ordinary man, or that of common experience"--is not a matter
of concern here. For a discussion of this kind of moral knowledge see
Maritain's discussion of such in "The 'Natural' Knowledge of Moral
Values," in Joseph W. Evans and Leo R. Ward, eds., ChalleLlges and 
Renewals, (Notre Dome: University of Notre !Jan? Press, 1966), pp. 229-38.
16The reason for the quotation marks will become evident in a
moment.
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entific knowledge of contingent things, or knowledge of the necessi-
ties and universalities which are realized in the world of actual con-
tingent existence. With regard to moral knowledge the problem may be
stated as that of acquir:rg scientific knowledge of contingent human
actions. There is a crucial difference, however, between the problem
of speculative knowledge and the problem of moral knowledge, or of
practical knowledge in general. As has been seen, the knowledge of the
speculative sciences can be accounted for. Moral knowledge, however,
which is purely philosophical moral knowledge (knowledge which con-
sists of conclusions arrived at merely through the use of natural reason)
cannot offer an adequate solution to the problem of knowledge, i.e.,
purely philosophical moral knowledge cannot be scientific knowledge.
Thus, the solution to the problem of accounting for moral knowledge
requires the involvement of more than just natural reason. First,
however, let es consider why purely philosophical moral knowledge can-
not be scientific
The difference referred to here between the problem of specu-
lative knowledge and the problem of practical knowledge is a result of
a difference, not yet mentioned, between speculative knowledge and prac-
tical knowledge, namely, the difference in the mode or type of concep-
tualization proper to each. In speculative knowledge, it will be re-
membered, the concepts formulated are resolved in being. Or, the ulti-
mate termination of concepts rIvolved in speculative knowledge is being.17
"Even though the experimental sciences attempt to attain know-
ledge of the being of sensible being, they must take exception to this
because their concepts are resolved in the sensible of sensible being,
and thus the being of smible being enly remains hinted at.
I
In practical knowledge, however, not only is the purpose of such, that
of attaining knowledge of human actions, but also the concepts involved
in such knowledge have their ultimate termination in human actions.
Speculative philosophy moves from contingent extramental things "towards
the Timeless by three moments of abstractive v1s1on..18 Practical phi-
losophy, however, resolves its concepts in human actions. More speci-
fically, with regard to purely philosophical moral knowledge, the prin-
ciples of such, formulated by natural reason, are always resolved in,
or are to be explained ultimately in terms of, human actions. The
principles of action of a purely philosophical moral knowledge are
meaningless unless they can be explained in terms of human action. For
example, the principles of action such as the duty of Kant, the liberty
of Sartre, or the utility of Mill, which are formulated solely by nat-
ural reason, are resolved in human actions. They are dependent upon
human actions for their meaning. If utility is taken as the principle
or end of human action, the concept of utility here has meaning because
of its explanation in terms of human actions. It is not explainable
here in terms of concepts of greater universality. The same is true
for all other principles of action which are formulated through natural
reason.
Because purely philosophical moral knowledge resolves its con-
cepts in human actions it cannot be scientific knowledge. The reason
for this is that human actions are contingent The resolution of con-
cepts in ccntin(ent human actions can be compared to the resolution of
concepts in the sensible of the sensible real as is proper to the ex-
18..otaritain, Science and Wisdom, p. 108.
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perimental sciences. It was noted previously
19 
that the experimental
sciences are imperfect sciences because of the resolution of their con-
cepts in the sensible, or in that of the sensible real which is sub-
ject to change. So also, the concepts of purely philosophical moral
knowledge are resolved in something changable, namely, the actions of
men capable of free choice. Thus the principles of human action which
are resolved in contingent human actions, in., those principles of
purely philosophical moral knowledge, are subject to the changes of
those actions, and are thus themselves chanyable. In other words,
the principles of purely philosophical moral knowledge are not neces-
sarily in conformity with the actions which are, and thus, cannot con-
stitute scientific knowledge.2°
This same point, that purely philosophical moral philosophy can-
not be a practical science because the knowledge offered by such lacks
the requirement of necessity, can be seen by pointing out that the prin-
ciples of such carry no necessity with regard to their being principles
which direct good actions, i.e., there is no necessity with regard to
their being normative or obligatory. Let us first consider two pas-
sages from Maritain which point to this characteristic of purely phi-
19See above, p. 50.
20If man existed in a pure state of nature, a purely philo-
sophical science of human actions would be possible. In a pure state
of nature man would not have existed as a fallen creature capable of
evil. With his freedom of choice, man would always choose the good.
If this were the case, then the contingencies of man's actions would
also be absent, and it would thus be possible, through the processes
of natural reason, to acquire a scientific knowledge of human actions,
or a knowledge of the principles or ends, and causes of human actions.
In fact, however, man does not exist in a pure state of nature. Rather,
he exists as a fallen creature who chooses to do evil. Thus, the prob-




But in the state ot fallen and redeemed nature in which we
actually live, a purely philosophical moral science would pre-
scribe good acts, because it would be based on natural right--
such as not to lie, not to commit injustice, to practice filial
piety, etc.
But the prescription of certain good acts is not enough to
form a practical science, a true science of the use of freedom,
a science which prescribes not only good acts, but which also de-
termines how the acting subject can live a life of consisteqc
goodness and organize rightly his whole universe of action."
It could also be pointed out that since, in this order, ends
play the role of principles, practical philosophy is not limited
to prescribing, as Kant would have had it. It is a science, it
knows. But it does not completely and truly know its object,
which is something to be done, unless it knows how it should be
done. Thus, despite the major role experience plays in it, the
knowledge that constitutes practical philosophy is not knowledge
of Simple observation. It is also and essentially, a regula-
tive science, a normative science."
lhe opposition expressed here is as follows. On the one hand,
there is the prescription of acts solely on the basis of "knowle.Ige of
simple observation" of human action. On the other hand, there is the
knowledge of what should be done, and this knowledge involves norms
which are not derived from observation of actual human actions. In
the former case, the knowledge adequate to the prescription of actions
is acquired or abstracted from various actual human actions, In the
latter case, the knowledge adequate to the direction of actions is not
dependent upon actual human actions. In other words, moral knowledge,
which is dependent upon various actual human actions for its formula-
tion, may result in the prescription of certain actions, but this pre-
'-,cr .lp.tion can have no normative basis, or it can have no obligation_at-
21Maritain, Science and Wisdom, p. 162.
22Maritain, The Degrees _of Knowledge, p. 313.
87
tached to it, since knowledge of principles of actual actions is not
knowledge of principles of correct or gped actions--or is not knowledge
of principles which direct what actions should or  should not be per-
formed. Thus, any principle of action which is dependent upon actual
human actions for its formulation (and is thus a principle of actual
human actions) does not carry an obligation with it. Or in other words,
there is no reason, and thus there is no necessity, for it to be norma-
tive for all people or even for all the actions of one person.23
Thus an ethic which has knowledge adequate to the prescription of "cer-
tain good acts" in this sense, does not consist of knowledge of the
necessary normative principles of free human action, and thus is not to
be regarded as scientific.24
Mural Philosophy as Impractical
Another inadequacy cf a purely philosophical ethic, according
23It might be objected that Kant's maxim, that only those ac-
tions should be performed which one records as universalizable, carries
normative weight since it takes all people into consideration. This
objection can be answered by pointing out that the judgments concerning
which actions should be subject to universalization are individual judg-
ments without any common criterion. This rule of universalization will
not help as the criterion for all of the actions of one man either, be-
cause even though each action is to be judged according to this rule,
there is no criterion for determining what acts ought to be universal-
ized. For example, the action of making a promise with the intention
of breaking it supposedly should not be performed, since its univer-
salization would result in the disruption of the welfare of the per-
son deciding whether to perform the action and the welfare of others.
What is not elucidated is what it is that would make the meaningless-
ness of promises constitute an evil. Thus the individual is left with-
out a criterion for determining which of his actions ought to be uni-
versalized.
24Because of this, purely philosophical moral knowledoe is not
only not scientific, hut also, it is not able to direct properly hu-
man actions.
8
to Maritain is that it fails to be truly practical.
A purely philosophical moral philosophy would only provide us
with a system of ends, of rules, and of achieved virtue (per-
fectae virtutes). This system would be doubtless good in itself,
but it would be a merely theoretical system, designed to estab-
lish in a state of 000dness a separated essence, a creature of
possibility, a human being other than man as we know him.25
In other words, in the state of fallen and redeemed nature, purely phi-
losophical moral knowledge remains only a theoretical construction of
ideal actions, and it would not be a truly py- ctical science. It would
not be practical because it would not account for the possibility of man
in his fallen nature to attain the ideal constructed.
I said above that every great moral system is in reality an
effort to ask man, in one manner or another and to one degree
or another, to go beyond his natural condition in some way. These
systems in fact (let us mention here only those which have been
examined in the present work) ask man . . . to go beyond the human
condition: either as with Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicurus,
Kant, Sartre, or Bergsor, by attaching himself to a good suner-
ior to human life, or to a happiness in which human life is achieved
rationally, or to virtue, or to pleasure decanted to the point
of indifference, or to duty, or to liberty, or to the sovereign
love to which the great mystics call us; or, as with Hegel, Marx,
Comte or Dewey, by deifying nature. But even in those cases where
the effort to go beyond the human condition is the most authentic,
there is no question, except in Bergson (and, in the name of faith,
in Kierkegaard) of truly transcending it. And the attempt to go
beyond the human condition by the sole means of man remains in the
last analysis doomed either to futility or to illusion. It is only
witn Christianity that the effort to go beyond the human condition
comes to real frultion.26
Thus a purely philosophical ethic, an ethic which accepts only the nat-
ural capabilities of man, or the capabilities subject to reason, re-
mains incapable of aiding or directing fr, J) to 'go beyond the human con-
dition."
25Maritain, Science and Wisdom, p. 163.
26Jacques V.aritain, Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Criti-
cal Survey of the Great Systinis-.77TETT-Yo-rk: Chat'les SCI-Mner's Sons,
196477T. 458.
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In pointing out these inadequacies of purely philosophical
moral knowledge, Maritain does not wish to deny the existence of such
knowledge, or the existence of a "natural ethic" altogether.
As I have tried to point out in an earlier workl natural
ethics really exists. It establishes precious truths and provides
the theologian with indispensable notional instruments. But taken
in itself, this moral philosophy inadequately considered is only
a beginning or sketch of science, or a mass of philosophical ma-
terials prepared ready for science.27
1De la Philosophie Chretienne, annexe II. Sur l'Ethique
naturelle.
The ends or principles of human action which are supplied by natural rea-
son are temporal ends, and such ends, because of their inherent contin-
gency can only by themselves, constitute a mass of philosophical data
concerning human actions. They can only command the necessity and uni-
versality required by scientific knowledge if they have their founda-
tion in something other than human action, namely in the Being of per-
fect Goodness. The temporal ends of naturl ethics can only cross the
"threshold of science" when they have been "integrated as part of a
living whole in a moral science capable of organizing in scientific
fashion all these materials because it does not ignore the true last
end of man and the actual conditions of his existence..28 Maritain
calls this position of natural ethics that of being "subalternated" to
theology, or specifically, to moral theology. Before we consider moral
philosophy in its subalternacion to moral theology, we shall make a brief
digression and consider what it is that moral philosophy needs to accept
from theology in order to be adequately considered.
27Maritain, Science and Wisdom, p. 166.
28Ibid.
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The True Final End  of Man 
We can reason, as we have just done, concernino the inadequa-
cies of purely philosophical moral knowledge, or of moral philosophy
as such. However, that which provides the solution to these inade-
quacies cannot be accepted on account of argumentation appealing to
reason, but rather can only be accepted through faith. We can ratio-
nally explain how the truths of moral theology provide the solutions
we are looking for (as we will attempt to do in the next section) but
such an explanation presupposes the acceptance thr-ugh faith of those
theological truths needed. The most fundamental precept of theologi-
cal knowledge which needs to be accepted by moral philosophy is the
object of our concern here.
The ultimate end of human life, and thus of human actions, is
a supernatural End. The end which provides the ideal, the "ought,"
for our actions consists of a participatory existence in God, the Being
of perfect Goodness, and is effected in this world by love of God and
his creation. Man goes "beyond the human condition" by even the most
insignificant of his acts if it is motivated by love of God, because
then that act has a supernatural "eternal value. '29 At this point,
certain passages in Maritain speak well enough for themselves.
It came as a strange novelty to learn that the final End cf human
life--not only as supreme Value good in itself and for itself,
but as the supreme Object the possession of which constitutes
huian happiness--is God Himself, the infinite Good, self-subsis-
tent Being. God in His intimate life, the uncreated Glory it-
self is the end in which our appetite for happiness will be sat-
isfied beyond measure."
29Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 4E6.
30Ibid., p. 75.
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For St. John of the Cross, as for St. Thomas Aquinas and the
whole Christian tradition, the final end of human life is trans-
formation in God, 'to become God by participation,' which is ful-
ly achieved in heaven by the beatific vision and beatific love,
and fulfilled here below, in faith, by love. The supernatural
love of charity, by which we love God and creatures with a pro-
perly divine love, makes us one with God and causes us to be one
same spirit with Him. Qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est. 'The
end of all actions and human affections,7-TvTites St. Thomas, 'is
the love of God, that is why there is no measure regulating that
love; it is itself the measure and measures everything else, and
can never be too great. The interior act of charity has the ratio
of an end because the highest good of man is that the soul adhere
to God, in accordance with the words of the Psalmist, 'It is good
to cling to God. . . .''31
The loving of the divine Good, as eloquently described above, is
of capital importance. Christian morality consists primarily of the
loving of the divine Good, God, and it is because of this that it is
also a morality of man's happiness. It does not consist primarily of
man's happiness. "Christian morality is a morality of beatitude, but
first and foremost it is a morality of the divine Good supremely loved."32
That is, man's desire for happiness is not the basis for his actions,
hut rather, man's love of the divine Good is the basis of his actions,
and because of this love he attains happiness. Man's motivation for
his actions is not the satisfaction of his own desire for happiness,
but this desire is satisfied by love of the divine Good.33
We can also notice that God, the divine Good, is the object of
the theological virtues which Christianity Hso brings to bear on hu-
man actions. These theological virtues compose a supernatural order of
virtue which is the perfecting of the natural order of virtues. The
31Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 320-2.
32Maritain, Moral  Philosophy, p. 79.
33Ib1d., pp. 78-80.
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virtues of faith, hope, and most importantly, love, are the theologi-
cal virtues of Christian morality, and the object of these virtues
is the divine Good in the supernatural order rather than the goods of
the hu.:aan order or the goods naturally attainable by man which are
enumerated by the moral virtues.34
One final point should be made here which concerns a distinc-
tion between the Christian notion of the divine Good being the final
end of man, and the Aristotelian notion of the Good as the final end of
man. Maritain distinguishes between the absolute ultimate End and the
subjective ultimate End of man. The former is God himself, and the lat-
ter is the possession of God, or "it is the direct union with the ab-
solute ultimate End, good in and for itself, which constitutes the sub-
jective ultimate End of the human being, his final fulfillment, his per-
fect and eternal happiness."35 For Aristotle, however, the Good is
man's happiness. He failed to distinguish between the Good and man's
happiness, or between the absolute ultimate End and man's happines.: on
account of his subjective ultimate End being what it is. This distinc-
tion must be made in order to retain the distinction between the per-
fect Goodness of God and the weakness of the human condition.
34
Ibid., p. 80.
35'Ibid., p. 76. Maritain points out in this connection that the
subjective ultimate End of man would not be what it is without the grace
of God because the absolute ultimate End is of the supernatural order and
it does not arise out of the natural order. Thus, man needs more than
natural abilities in order for his subjective ultimate End to consist of
a union with the absolute ultimate End. Without the grace of Cod there
would he an "infinite abyss" between the absolute ultimate End rnd man's
subjective ultimate End. "The astonishing tidings brought by Christian-
ity were that in fact, and by the free and gratuitous superabundance of
divine generosity, the separation, the cleavage of which we have just spo-
ken between the absolute ultimate End and the subjective ultimate End




Let us now proceed with our consideration of the subalterna-
tion of moral philosophy to moral theology.
Moral Philosophy as Subalternated to
Moral Theology 
If moral philosophy is considered as subalternated to moral
theology, then the problem encountered by purely philosophical moral
knowledge receives its solution. This problem, it will be remembered,
is that of not having the certitude and universality required by sci-
entific knowledge, and that of remaining a theoretical construct by
not being able to account for the possibility of man's attainment of
the ideal. We must here consider how subalternation results in the so-
lution to these problems. We must also, in the present discussion of
subalternation, consider the differences and the subalternating ,e-
lation between moral theology and moral philosophy.
Moral Philosophy as a Practical Science
A subalternated science is a science in which the truths or
principles proper to it are known scientifically because of their de-
pendence on the truths or principles of the subalternating science.
It is through the truths or principles of the subalternating science
that the truths or principles of the subalternated science are known
scientifically. Thus, a subalternated science "cannot even exist as
science without the illumination it receives from the superior science;
it is established As a science, i.e., as knowledge which is equipped





it needs from the superior science."36 Moral philosophy is subal-
ternated to moral theology, then, in that the former recognizes and
accepts the certain and universal knowledge of the latter. The know-
ledge of moral philosophy, or the principles of action developed by
such, attain the status of scientific knowledge by being founded in the
knowledge proper to the science of moral theology. In other words, the
concepts of moral philosophy subalternated to moral theology are not re-
solved in the contingencies of human action, but rather, are resolved
in the Being of perfect Goodness, which is known as the final End of
man's actions by moral theology. Furthermore, it is only when moral
philosophy is firmly grounded in the certain and universal knowledge
of moral theology that the principles of moral philosophy attain the ob-
ligatory nature required by a norm for the regulation and direction of
all human actions.
The solution to the second problem of purely philosophical
moral knowledge which was discussed is also found in the recognition
of the involvement of the supernatural in moral knowledge. The problem
was that purely philosophical moral knowledge, since it only considered
man's abilities which are susceptable to being known through natural
reason, was not able to account for man's attainment of the ideal which
was constructed. With the recognition of the involvement of the super-
natural in moral knowledge, however, one of the truths which moral phi-
losophy accepts on faith from moral theology is the grace of C,od toward
man. 'That it is possible for man to attain absolute happiness is not
36Maritaio, Science and Wisdom, p. 111.
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a datum of reason or 01 philosophy, hut of Christian faith."37 The
Possibility for man to attain the ideal, the final End, offered by a
Christian ethic, or moral philosophy subalternated to moral theology,
is known as actual by faith, and it is actually the case because of the
grace of God toward man. It is "by the free and gratuitous superabun-
dance of divine generosity," that man can attain his final End.
38
The Relation and Difference Between
Moral Philosophy and Moral Theology
We have so far only referred to subalternation as that of the
subalternated science accepting the truths of the subalternating sci-
ence. This obviously is a very general notion of the relation between
the two. Thus we must consider more closely the relation and differ-
ence between the knowledge of the subalternating science of moral the-
ology, and the knowledge of the subalternated science of moral p;.ilo-
sophy.
There are two fundamental differences between the knowledge
of moral theology and the knowledge of moral philosophy. By consid-
ering these two differences in the kind of knowledge proper to each we
will also be able to understand better the relation of subalternation
between these two different kinds of knowledge of human actions. The
first difference concerns the mode of conceptualization involved in
each. The second difference, which results from the first, concerns
the different aspects of the object of moral knowledge (human actions)
which are dealt with by 1oral philosophy and moral theology.
37Maritain, Moral Philosupy, p. 76.
38lhid., p. 77.
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The object of moral knowledge in general is human actions. Hu-
man actions are, what may be called, the formal perspective of man which
is being considered, or the formal perspective of the object as thing.039
There are also different ways of conceptualizing this object of know-
ledge—the actions of man. These different ways or modes of concep-
tualization can be called "the formal perspective of the object as ob-
ject, or the ratio formalis sub qua, the formal perspective under which
the object, . . is attained by the mind. '° Maritain's term for re-
ferring to a formal perspective of conceptualization is "objective light..41
The mode of conceptualization of human acts which is proper to
moral philosophy is that concerning human action which is knowable by
natural, practical reason, (the principles or ends of human action which
are knowable by natural reason). It considers human acts in terms of
the principles of such which are knowable by natural reason. T ob-
jective light of moral philosophy then consists of that concerning hu-
man actions which is intelligible through reason. For moral theology,
on the other hand, the objective light consists of the principles of
39Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, p. 126
40Ibid., pp. 127-8.
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Naritain formulates these distinctions between "the formal
perspective of the object as thing, and "the formal perspective of
the object as object" in connection with the distinctions between the
speculative sciences, and he also uses them in connection with the dis-
tiections between moral theology and moral philosophy. For example, the
philosophy of nature and the experimental sciences have the same formal
perspective (sensible being) of the object as thing (being as a whole),
but they have differing formal perspectives of the object as object, or
as conceptualized. The objective light of the former is the being of
sensible being, and the objective light of the latter is the sensible
of the sensible being. Sensible being is conceived Insofar as it is being,
and it is conceived insofar as it is sensible. These same distinctions
were presented in greater detail in the former chapter, however, the terms
presented here were not used.
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human action which are intelligible ultimately through revelation.
The relation of subalternation between moral philosophy and
moral theology can be explained in terms of their respective objective
lights. As seen in a previous section, the principles of human action
which are known by moral philosophy as such, or in purely philosophical
moral knowledge, cannot constitute scientific knowledge. The objective
light of moral philosophy alone is inadequate for the acquisition of
scientific knowledge of human actions. What is needed is the objec-
tive light of moral theology. If the principles of human action which
are known by revelation in moral theology are accepted by moral philo-
sophy, then the principles known by moral philosophy participate in,
or are grounded in the certitude and universality of the knowledge of
moral theology. Consequently, moral philosophy in its position of sub-
alternation to moral theology constitutes a science of human actions.
"Moral philosophy adequately considered thus views human acts insofar
as their regulation by human reason constitutes a universe of (prac-
tical) intelligibility, which only becomes a universe of science if
reason listens to theology, and is thus assisted and perfected in the
performance of its natural work. 42
In order to explain this relation of subalternation more com-
pletely in view of the differing objective lights, it would be worth-
while to consider the differing complementary roles of faith and rea-
son in the acquisition of the knowledge of moral theology (which re-
42. At this point, the solution offered by the subalternation of
moral philosophy to moral theology to the problem, considered earlier)
namely, that of moral philosophy as such not being scientific knowledge,
can be understood. Maritain, Science and Wisdom, p. 187.
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lies primarily on revelation requiring faith) and of the knowledge of
moral philosophy (which relies primarily on reason).
In moral philosophy, faithful acceptance of theological truths
relevant to human action elevates the process of reasoning in that rea-
son is considered as a second principle cause of knowledge in moral phi-
losophy. Knowledge of the theological truths which are relevant to hu-
man actions, and which are acquired through faith in that which is re-
vealed, is the first principle cause of knowledge in moral philosophy.
Just as the moon is a principle cause of light, it is a second prin-
ciple cause because it receives its light from the first principle cause,
the sun; so also, the process of reason is a principle cause of know-
ledge in moral philosophy, but it is a second principle cause because
moral philosophy faithfully accepts the theological knowledge relevant
to human actions.43 It is through faith then that the philosopher in-
volved in moral philosophy accepts the truths of theology, and this
acceptance allows the knowledge acquired by reason to be considered as
scientific knowledge. "in this way faith uplifts philosophy . . . so
as to subalternate practical philosophy to theology. It is the  power
of faith, communicated to the reason of  the philosopher, which brings 
practical philosophy in subalternation to theology."
44
Thus the pro-
cess of reasoning in moral philosophy begins with the acceptance of
theological truths. The reasoning in Aoral philosophy by which con-
clusions are reached makes use of theological premises which it accepts
by faith, and because of 1:his acceptance, the reasoning in moral phi-
431b1d., p. 194.
44Ibid., p. 197, (italics mine).
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losophy is not purely philosophical. It must be remembered however
that reason remains a principle cause of knowledge in moral philosophy.
The objective light here is human aided by divine, and is not divine
alone. "Moral philosophy adequately considered is a form of knowledge
which is rooted on earth; but which being grafted on theological truths
has for this reason a sap strong enough to lead it to true conclusions
[concerning the] natural and supernatural mystery of human behavior."45
That is, natural reasoning, aided by the truths of moral theology, is
the source46 of knowledge in moral philosophy, rather than divine rev-
elation alone. Maritain summarizes the subalternation of moral philo-
sophy to moral theology in terms of the mode of conceptualization, or
in terms of the relation of their respective objective lights, in the
following passage.
And so we understand that moral philosophy adequately con-
sidered receives conclusions elaborated by theology not as simple
rlatter of fact which must be taken into account, but as true prin-
ciples of science. And it makes use of them itself just as every
other subalternated science makes use of the principles received
from the subalternating science. But in this case the principles
received do not constitute all the principles of the subalternated
science. They are received so as to perfect and complete other
principles of knowledge. These two sets of principles have their
sources in two different universes, one in the universe of the God-
head, and the other in the universe of created nature. Which neans
that the light of moral philosophy adequately considered, while
it implies a certain participation in the light of theology, is
a light necessarily inferior to the light of theology. And it is
for this reason that it can co-exist in the subject with theology,
without being lost in or identified with it.
In brief, faith and the light of divine revelation can them-
selves form a science by making use 7inisteria1ly of the truths of
reason. And that science is theology. Or they can help and ele-
-
45Ibid., p. 11: 2.
461he term Thource" is obviously used here in terms of the mode
of conceptualization ..nd not in terms of the object of knowledge. That
is, no trace of rationalism is to be looked for here.
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vate reason in its effort to form for itself and in virtue of an
intellectual need of its nature a (practical) science which can-
not be rightly constituted without this aid--that is to say,
without putting trust in the truths established by theology and
without being subalternated to the 'impression in us of the di-
vine mind'. And this science is moral philosophy adequately con-
sidered.47
The complementary roles of faith and reason in moral theology,
however, differ from the roles of reason and faith in moral philo-
sophy. It would be well to consider these roles here as a point of
contrast.
The role of reason in moral theology, and in theology in gen-
eral, is that of an "instrumental and ministerial cause in relation
to the light of faith."48 What does this mean? Theology does not
consist of the application of philosophical reasoning to the data of
revelation. It does not submit the data of revelation to human rea-
soning, or judgment and discernment. Rather, just the opposite Es the
case. Theology consists of judging the results of human reason by the
revealed data. It consists of submitting or subordinating the results
of human reason to the revealed data accepted by faith. 'Thus, moral
theology is in no sense simply moral philosophy enriched by the data
of faith. Nor is it moral philosophy as enlightened and elevated by
faith..49 As indicated above, the objective light of moral theology
consists of that which is known of human actions through revelation
and our faith in such. The role which the human element of reason plays
in this objective light is that of an instrumental aid for  the under-
standing of that which must be accepted as true by faith.
47Maritain, Science and Wisdom, pp. 200-1.
4048Ibid., p. 194. -Ibid., p. 113.
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Thus, the difference in the respective objective lights, or
the modes of conceptualization of mural philosophy and moral theology--
the former consisting of the principles known through reason perfected
by those known through faith, and the latter consisting of revealed
principles known through faith--is one fundamental difference between
moral philosophy and moral theology. The sobalternation of moral phi-
losophy to moral theology in terms of their differing objective lights,
consists of the fact that the principles of moral philosophy, known by
natural reason, need and find their perfection in the principles of
moral theology which are known through faith.
We must now indicate briefly the second difference between
moral philosophy and moral theology, which concerns the different as-
pects of human actions which are dealt with by each. As indicathd
previously, human action is the formal perspective of the object, man,
as an actually existing thing, and it is this formal perspective which
is considered in moral knowledge. Also, as just considered, different
formal perspectives of the object as object are proper to moral phi-
losophy and moral theology. This difference in objective light "brings
in its turn a (specific) diversity in what may be called induced or
secondary formal perspectives of reality, in the aspects according to
which the same reality of human behaviour is presented to different
sciences., .50 Quite simply, these different aspects of the same object
cf knowledge (human action) can be stated as follows. The aspect of
human ,ction which is presented to moral philosophy consists of the
natural and temporal ends or principles of human action. The aspect of
50Ibid., p. 178.
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human action which is presented to moral theology, on the other hand,
consists of the supernatural last End of human action. The question
now concerns how the supernatural last End of human action is involved
in, or related to, moral philosophy. The appropriate response is that
the natural ends of human behavior are fulfilled or are completed by
and in the supernatural last End. The supernatural last End is a
concern for moral philosophy insofar as the natural ends of man find
their fulfillment and completion as ends in it. The supernatural 1st
End, viewed from the point of view of moral philosophy, can be seen
"as the supreme realization of the desires of [man's] nature, stretching
beyond their limit through superabundance of grace.H51 Thus, the natu-
ral ends which are the primary concern of moral philosophy are not
isolated from the supernatural End, since the former, as distinct ends
which constitute a particular aspect of human action, are fulfilled by
the latter.
We have thus presented an example of philosophical knowledge
which is scientific and which forms the basis for the direction of hu-
man action in terms of the good of man. Moral philosophy adequately
considered, or moral philosophy subalternated to moral theology, is
not confronted with, and thus solves, the problems that purely philo-
sophical moral philosophy is left with. Purely philosophical moral
knowledge is inadeyJate as scientific knowledge because it relies sole-
51At this point, the solution offered by the involvement of the
supernatural in moral knowledge to the problem considered earlier, name-
ly, that of moral philosophy as such not being able to account for man's
attainment of the ideal, is again evident. Maritain, Science and Wis-
dom, p. 179.
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ly on actual human actions for the formation of principles of action,
and thus because it resolves its concepts in actual human actions
which are contingent. Furthermore, purely philosophical moral know-
ledge is restricted to knowledge of man's capabilities which are sub-
ject to intelligibility through reason, i.e., those capabilities of
man's fallen nature. Because of this restriction, purely philosophical
moral knowledge cannot account for the possibility of man acting as
the principles formulated maintain he should. Moral philosophy sub-
alternated to moral theology solves these problems through the involve-
ment of the Being of perfect Goodness. The certainty of the final End
for the orientation of all man's actions, and the possibility--given
through the grace of God--of attaining this final End are provided by
the involvement of the Eeing of perfect Goodness. Moral philosophy,
as subalternated to moral theology, accepts the truths of moral the-
ology (particularly man's final End) which provide a "sure footing" for
moral philosophy. Also, in the relation of subalternation, the super-
natural final End for man's actions is the End which, through the grace
of God, can actually be the fulfillment of man's natural ends.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This work has consisted essentially of a reflection on know-
ledge. We have been following Maritain in seeking to acquire knowledge
about knowledge. This method of reflection has produced an account
of knowledge which justifies knowledge of being other than the knower.
We have followed the formation of the concept from the thing as thing
or extramental being "through" the thing as object to the species or
presentative form which intentionally exists as part of the knower
and which is a formal sign by which the known object is intelliaible;
and we have returned to the data with which we began--extramental
being--in the process of judgment. This reflection has also produced
defense of the scientific nature of the kinds of speculative know-
ledge and of a kind of practical knowledge. In the speculative order,
modern science was placed among other kinds of scientific speculative
knowledge. In the realm of the sensible real we have seen the orienta-
tion toward being of the philosophy of nature, and the orientation of
the experimental sciences toward the sensible. In the realm of the
trans-sensible we have seen the concern for the being as being of ma-
terial being; and in the realm of the transintelligible we have seen the
concern--through ananoetic intellection—for the being as being of im-
material being. In the practical order also, we have considered a kind
of scientific knowledge, namely, moral philosophy as subalternated to
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moral theology, or moral philosophy which relies on the Being of per-
fect Goodness and takes into consideration man's supernatural final
End.
Although the present reflection has produced sufficient sup-
port for the major interests in this work, we are left with merely an
outline. This outline is sufficient to point out the main kinds of
knowledge and their major differences, and it is sufficient in showing
that there are other kinds of knowledge than the knowledge of modern
science which are scientific knowledge, i.e., certain and explanatory
of what there is. This outline is also sufficient to point cut that
knowledge includes knowledge of actual and potential being which is
other than the knower. It remains however, an outline which must be
expanded and filled in.
The account of knowledge in general, which forms the basis for
discussions of other kinds of knowledge, can be expanded in terms of
its contrast with other accounts of knowledge, for only the most fun-
damental differences with some other important historical systems have
been mentioned. We noted the major difference between an idealist ac-
count of knowledge and Maritain's account as being that of a difference
concerning the role of extramental being, or the role of particular and
contingent things, in the acquisition of knowledge. On the other hand,
we have noted a major difference between empiricist's accounts of
knowledge and Maritain's account as being that of a difference concer-
ning the nature of the known as known. These contrasting positions,
however, are capable certainly of being subjected to discussions of
greater detail. There are other accounts of knowledge which have not
been mentioned altogether, and these--for example, positivism or pray-
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matism—can also be contrasted with Maritain's account.
The account of knowledge in general can also be expanded in
terms of some specific topics which were involved in it. For example,
a discussion of actuality and potentiality, particularly in terms of
existence and intelligibility, could be undertaken for two reasons:
first, because of its crucial position in discussions concerning the
objects of knowledge; and secondly, because of its lack of involvement
in major accounts of knowledge since Descartes. Also, the notions
themselves and the implications of undesignated and designated matter
could be explored in greater detail in view of their involvement in
abstraction and particularly in the nature of the object of knowledge,
i.e., the thing as thing and the thing as object.
The discussion of the different kinds of speculative sciences
also remains as an outline. Each of these different kinds of knowledge
can be reflected on and scrutinized in greater detail. Such inquiries
can possibly be so detailed as to require actual involvement in the
acquisition of the kind of knowledge being reflected upon. This is
particularly true with regard to the knowledge of the experimental sci-
ences. Although the philosophy of science is devoted to reflection
upon such knowledge, adequate reflection in this area may require that
the philosopher of science also be a scientist in the modern sense of
the term. This gives an indication cf the vast expanses which have yet
to be explored in the philosophy of science. For example, the ways or
the methods in which the experimental sciences rely on the sensible
would be a topic of discussion which would follow the recognition that
the complete reliance, of the experimental sciences, on the sensible,
in order to give meaning to their concepts, is peculiar to those sci-
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ences. Also, in view of the growing involvement of mathematics in
the experimental sciences, especially physics, a detailed account of
mathematical knowledge itself, and its application to the experimental
sciences would be very much in order. After recognizing that the use
of mathematics in the experimental sciences involves a transformation
of the sensible real into mathematical terms (terms which always re-
main dependent upon the sensible real), one can ask what the nature of
this transformation is, or how it is possible for such a transforma-
tion to occur in an explanation of the sensible real.
We have also left some related topics completely untouched.
Barring limited capabilities in the time allottede this work could have
followed Maritain into other areas and inquired into the kind of know-
ledge which is proper to each. In the practical order we left off
with a consideration of speculatively practical knowledge or moral know-
ledge. This investigation could have continued into Maritain's con-
tributions to social and political philosophy. That is, we could fol-
low the application of ethics to collective action and in doing so we
could notice the relevance of man's supernatural final End to his so-
cietal life and the governing of such. Once it is understood that the
knowledge concerning this aspect of man's life must be grounded in his
supernatural final End, just as is the case with moral knowledge, then
the application of this final End to the societal life of man and the
governing of such can take place. For example, in view of the cur-
rent popularity of sociological descriptive norms of collective hu-
man action, supplementary inquiries could be undertaken into the rel-
evant obligatory norms emanating from man' ;Anal End. Also, in view
of this application, one could enter into an interesting discussion
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concerning the separation of church and state, and particularly con-
cerning the propriety of ecclesiastical silence with regard to politi-
cal and social affairs.
The realm of practically practical knowledge, which involves
aesthetics for example, has also been left untouched. The area of
aesthetics would prove to be fruitful for a continuation of the dis-
cussion of the involvement of being in knowledge. That is, we could
proceed to inquire into the kind of knowledge--the knowledge of the
artist--which is necessary for and results in the production of being.
Maritain's philosophy of history could also be looked into in order to
determine te nature of historical knowledge. Discussions concerning
the practicality of historical knowledge or discussions concerning
the purpose in general of acquiring historical knowledge would be in-
volved here. One could inquire into the ways in which historical know-
ledge is speculative--if it is at all--and the ways in which it is
practical. With regard to the certainty of historical knowledge there
could be a dialogue with contemporary hermeneutical discussions by in-
quiring into the relevance of a critical realist account of knowledge
to the determination of the proper rules of interpretation of historical
texts. Finally, we could continue this work by investigating Maritain's
philosophy of education and thus see how his account of knowledge works
itself out in this area also. For example, we could investigate the
implication--in terms of the communication of knowledge--of the con-
tention that knowledge is knowledge of particular things as opposed to
universal Ideas or Forms. We could inquire into the implications
which this contention has for the presentation of knowledge. That is,
in view of this contention, we could ask whether teaching consists of
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the presentation of particular things as hints of the concept that one
desires to communicate, or whether it consists of the presentation of
the already made, universal Idea which is common to all those who know
of it.
Thus, we have conducted a reflection on some differing kinds
of knowledge. By examining a contemporary Thomistic critique of know-
ledge, we have discovered some things which are implicit in some his-
torical accounts of knowledge and also some contemporary assumptions
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